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ABSTRACT
Researchers and policy experts point to key issues and groups such as the
Palestinian/Arab‐Israeli Conflict, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Saudi exported Wahhabism,
and, in more recent times, the Iraq wars as being the source of militant Islam in this day in age.
However, this perspective ignores key issues and ideals in to how this new form of Islam has
emerged in recent decades. For instance, with all the conflicts that have occurred in recent
decades, except for the 1979 Revolution in Iran, why have they not yielded Shari’a inspired
Islamic states in Yemen, Lebanon, the Occupied Territories and Iraq? Currently the only Islamic
states in the Arab world are ones that lay on the Persian Gulf that were established during their
independence from colonial rule.
One only has to look further east and to the north of the Middle East to see militant
Islam taking hold in places like Chechnya, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Waziristan and a
host of other areas which do not get the attention from many people in the West. After the
demise of the Soviet Union and the years directly after, a political vacuum was formed that
received almost no attention from the outside world except for states with historical and
cultural similarities. Here Islam has and is being used as a military and political doctrine to
accomplish goals and as an ideological base for launching new attacks against its proclaimed
enemies. Indeed many of the key theologians and figures have come from the Arab world, but
the rise of militant Islam could not have formed with this alone. Many of the fighters on the
ii

ground in al‐Qaeda and its direct affiliated groups are indeed not Arabs but come from a wide
range of different ethnic groups such as Afghans, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Uyghurs and Pakistanis who
have answered bin Laden’s call of lesser jihad against the West.
Rather than examining militant Islam through a Middle Eastern perspective, this author
wishes to give an alternate view that the current rise of militant Islam in the world is directly
associated with the internal political situation of the Greater Caspian Sea Basin and not the
Middle East as so many people have proposed in the past. To examine this idea, this author will
look extensively at the internal conditions of states that have allowed militant Islam to arise and
mature in such a short time span in this often forgotten region. The primary purpose of the
proposed paper is to examine the rise of militant Islam through a Caspian Sea region lens rather
than a Middle Eastern one. This study will also examine violent groups in various states to
understand how groups are able to form and how they differ from each other. Countries
ranging from as far as Turkey to the Xinxiang Province in China and from the southern reaches
of the Russian Federation to Pakistan will be the primary focus.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Militant Islam Today

Since the attacks on September 11th in New York City, Pennsylvania and Washington
D.C. the United States has turned its foreign policy attention away from the Cold War mentality,
revolving around Russia and the communist bloc, and toward the hot bed of political and
religious unrest in the Middle East and the Arab world. The Saudi born leader of the attacks is
Osama bin Laden who with his al‐Qaeda network is a primarily Arab group who wish to
overthrow the regimes throughout the Arab and Muslim world and reestablish the Islamic
Caliphate. Consequently Western governments see the rise of militant Islam strictly as an
Arabic phenomenon that threatens to spill over to other areas of the Islamic world as far as the
Philippines and even parts of Western Europe and the US.
Researchers and policy experts point to key issues and groups such as the
Palestinian/Arab‐Israeli Conflict, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Saudi exported Wahhabism,
and, in more recent times, the Iraq wars as being the source of militant Islam. However, this
perspective ignores key issues and ideals in how this new form of Islam has emerged in recent
decades. For instance, with all the conflicts that have occurred in recent decades, except for
the 1979 Revolution in Iran, why have these not yielded Shari’a inspired Islamic states in
Yemen, Lebanon, the Occupied Territories and Iraq? Currently the only Islamic states in the
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Arab world are ones that lie along the Persian Gulf that were established during their
independence from colonial rule.
One only has to look further east and to the north of the Middle East to see militant
Islam taking hold in places like Chechnya, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Waziristan and a
host of other areas which do not get the attention from many people in the West. After the
demise of the Soviet Union and the years directly after, a political vacuum was formed that
received almost no attention from the outside world except for states with historical and
cultural similarities. Here Islam has and is being used as a military and political doctrine to
accomplish goals and as an ideological base for launching new attacks against its proclaimed
enemies. Indeed many of the key theologians and figures have come from the Arab world, but
the rise of militant Islam could not have formed with this alone. Many of the fighters on the
ground in al‐Qaeda and its direct affiliated groups are indeed not Arabs but come from a wide
range of different ethnic groups such as Afghans, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Uyghurs and Pakistanis who
have answered bin Laden’s call to lesser jihad against the West.
Rather than examining militant Islam through a Middle Eastern perspective, this author
wishes to give an alternate view that the current rise of militant Islam in the world is directly
associated with the internal political situation of the Greater Caspian Sea Basin and not the
Middle East as so many people have proposed in the past. To examine this idea, this author will
look extensively at the internal conditions of states that have allowed militant Islam to arise and
2

mature in such a short time span in this often forgotten region. The primary purpose of the
proposed paper is to examine the rise of militant Islam through a Caspian Sea region lens rather
than a Middle Eastern one. This study will also examine violent groups in various states to
understand how groups are able to form and how they differ from each other. Countries
ranging from as far as Turkey to the Xinxiang Province in China and from the southern reaches
of the Russian Federation to Pakistan will be the primary focus.

The Road Less Studied

From this analysis of the Greater Caspian Sea region, a new policy perspective can be
viewed that moves toward other areas in the Islamic world. The “War on Terror” that is
currently under way has focused on the Palestinian/Arab‐Israeli conflict, Saudi Arabia‘s
Wahabist interpretation of Islam, the current invasion and occupation of Iraq, and Shia
controlled Syria and Iran with only limited focus on the war in Afghanistan. The West has only
focused on these select few countries because of the competition for resources and allies
during the Cold War with the Soviet Union. However, the west, and particularly the United
States, has not addressed the areas that composed the former Soviet Union in any type of
policy initiative until very recently as they shared almost no historical commonality with
Europe.
3

Because of this, this study could provide some foundation for future policy initiatives
not just in combating militant Islam in the future but in formatting and implementing policy
toward the region. With the war in Iraq spinning out of control and the current crises in Gaza
and the West Bank, the US and its allies have not become any safer. Leaders in states outside
the Middle East have gained little attention outside of the economic and direct military threat
spheres. Areas like Tajikistan, Chechnya, Uzbekistan and Pakistan gain little attention for the
US government outside the occasional air strike or harsh language from world leaders to
suppress Islamic movements. By examining the current militant Islamic movements outside the
Middle East, important policy changes may be considered if it can be proven that the internal
political conditions of these areas play a larger role that previously believed.
Unlike other areas of the Islamic world such as Indonesia, Thailand and the southern
Philippines where strong Islamic movements have very often turned violent, the Caspian Sea
region has played large roles in the global movement of militant Islam. Areas in South‐East Asia
and in the Pacific Rim though may have international connections that do not threaten to spill
over and engulf their neighbors in similar situations that we see today in Afghanistan and other
states. Most of the East Asian Islamic movements are based around a small minority of
disenfranchised people who wish for more political and economic freedom. However, there
has been a domino effect in the Caspian region since the fall of the Soviet Union which
illustrates how interlinked these states and groups have become in the past fifteen years.
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Many of these other movements are associated with nationalist movements where the Muslim
population is an ethnic minority and live in less developed areas.
Lastly, with regard to the various conflicts in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia occurring
today, this study will bring many of them, some that have almost no contribution in the English
literature, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and current Waziristan conflicts
in Pakistan, to the forefront of modern militant Islam.

As the current “War on Terror” has no

foreseeable end in sight it is imperative that the English literature address these remote and
previously unknown groups which have banded together to understand their mentality in
allying themselves with the Taliban and al Qaeda. Understanding how these groups have
evolved over the decades will be a vital aspect in creating and implementing new policies for
the future.
In addition, a theoretical understanding in how stateless movements are able to form
can be explored and examined. With every day the world is moving away from a state centered
system and toward a world where borders play a less important role than they once did. This
study can provide a case study of how non‐state movements are able to pick up momentum
and produce a network that can stretch over the entire world without having a capital to from
which to operate from. If this author can accurately show that the internal conditions that
were present in the Caspian Basin can produce this type of trans‐state network, then this would
contribute to the greater understanding of how and where non‐governmental groups are able
5

to start and thrive. A theoretical understanding of fundamentalism in general can also be
gained if certain internal conditions can be shown to create an environment that breeds these
ideals.

Past Works

The literature dealing with Islamic militancy is quite large with many authors from
various disciplines weighing in and applying various theories from economics to historical
causes to religious differences. This thesis will cover a wide selection of previous works
conducted in explaining militant Islam. Because most of the literature in English focuses on
how the Middle East is and has been the center of this movement, this study will use this
foundation as a source of how a Caspian Sea perspective differs and surpass a Middle Eastern
one. This does not mean, however, that there is no literature on this area outside the Middle
East, although most of it has come out of the events the attacks of September 11th and from a
strong Western or US policy lens. Though this research will focus somewhat on how to stem
the rise of militant Islam, it will trace the roots and argue that the internal politics of states have
allowed this phenomenon to form. We will deal with the research in a chronological format to
trace how authors have evolved in their research.

6

No literature review of militant Islam can exclude Samuel P. Huntington’s thesis in
“Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order”. Huntington suggests that the coming
conflicts will not be based on economics or ideology but on cultural lines. Though he does not
predict the rise of Islamic militarism against the West, his theory does illustrate how one
‘civilization’, the Islamic world, is against everything that another is composed of. Huntington
does state that the western civilization will come into conflict with one or more other
civilizations because of its top position in world politics. The Islamic world is simply the first of
many challenges against the West’s dominance in the world. 1
A less known but still very important author is Mark Tessler who uses the case study of
Algeria to explain the rise of Islamic movements in his article, “The Origins of Popular Support
for Islamic Movements”. Instead of giving a religious perspective to the situation, Tessler states
groups quickly become religious affiliated because of the already established network of
mosques and the ability to criticize the existing order without fear of reprisal. Religion becomes
simply the means to replace the existing government and not necessarily the primary cause. In
a sense the movements are not religious in nature but to an outsider looking in at the start of
political unrest would only see a radical Islamic movement with the idea of destroying the
existing regime. The author also states that very often these groups do not become stable
party’s once in government and forced to produce results as their power rests solely in
criticizing. 2

7

An examination of Central Asian terrorist groups in particular up to 1999 are analyzed in
Anna Zelkina’s paper, “Islam and Security in the New States of Central Asia: How Genuine is the
Islamic Threat”. Zelkina finds that by studying the various Islamic groups in the three major
countries with major Islamic groups, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the many Islamic
populations, except in Tajikistan, have no tradition of political parties but form religious groups
at all levels of society.

These groups even bond with secular groups as well when the

government begins to crack down on all possible opposition groups. Then these groups receive
financial and logistical support from outside states which also supply other groups in the region
as well. This allows some level of unity amongst the groups in different countries as fighters
and commanders travel from hot stop to hot spot. 3
Writing before the events on 9/11, Bernard Lewis, considered one of the foremost and
influential scholars on the Middle East, in his book “The Crises of Islam: Holy War and Unholy
Terror” presents the causes of militant Islam in the governments of the Arab countries
themselves. Lewis points to economic and political inequalities and backwardness as the
driving causes throughout the Middle East and which causes militant groups to rise and contest
the status quo. In addition, very radical interpretations to Islam, primarily Wahhabism, has
added another layer to the problem as many of these groups see everything Western as
something that has caused their suffering. Even Muslims who have adopted Western ways are
considered to be enemies of these fundamentalist groups. The primary goal of all these
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militant groups is to return the Islamic world to its historical place of grandeur and reestablish
the Islamic Caliphate based on Shari’a law. 4
Another case study is in “The Russians, Chechens and the Black Gold: a Geo‐economic
Explanation for the Chechen War” by Andrew Towner who gives an example of how conflicts in
the region can erupt through economic means. Towner states that multiple economic causes,
some dating back over decades, were the true cause for the Chechen conflicts. The Islamic
factor was simply a unifying factor used to rally the people’s support. The conflict started when
the Federal Republic pushed for economic and political independence. Because of key oil
infrastructure and resources the Russian Federation could not allow this without consequence.
The political factors primarily include the Caucasus states pushing for more independence
directly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The author does point out that this war has
no one single cause but stems from a multiple number of factors, both economic and political,
that came together at the wrong time. 5
John L. Esposito in his book, “Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam”, comes very
close to giving a true Caspian Sea region focus on the creation of modern militant Islam. He
proves an account of the evolution of al Qaeda and bin Laden from the Soviet‐Afghan War to
September 11th. Esposito focuses both on the psychological as well as the physical attributes
that created al‐Qaeda from both the Arab world as well as the greater Islamic community. The
author shows how the ideologies from Egypt and Pakistan came to the forefront as groups like
9

the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Taliban were able to gain momentum
where the internal conditions where prime for breeding hostile ideologies. Instead of looking
narrowly at the Middle East, the author looks at the entire Islamic world as a stage for al‐Qaeda
and gives examples of various areas and how they have contributed to bin Laden’s cause. 6
Ahmed Rashid, a well known and respected reporter and author in the region, looks at
Central Asian Islamic groups in his book, “Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia”, and
argues that the prime reason for Islamic militarism is that the oppressive regimes in Central
Asia have caused different groups in the five newly independent republics to rise and contest
the ex‐Soviet leaders. One can see how the civil war in Tajikistan was able to topple the
government and create a reasonably stable government and claim some success as an Islamic
group became one of two leading parties in government. Other states like Uzbekistan are still
combating Islamic groups which have become bold enough to attempt numerous assassination
attempts against the president. Rashid also points to how some of the harsher attempts to
stamp out all forms Islamic fundamentalism have forced other groups which have remained
mostly peaceful, such as Hizb ut‐Tahrir (HT) to turn more militant. This in turn has caused the
level of militant attacks to increase against the government. 7
Another of Bernard Lewis’s books is entitled “What Went Wrong?: Western Impact and
Middle Eastern Response” which also details why the European and Muslim world has come
into conflict in past decades. Here he states that after the rise of the Islamic world, the West
10

began to defeat the Islamic Caliphates first on the battlefield and then in the market place.
What once was the center of the world for the arts and sciences was reduced to eventually
being a colony by the same people they thought were uncivilized barbarians. As a result the
Muslim world began to blame their own internal problems on Christians and then Jews. Lewis
discredits the policies that the European powers implemented on the Islamic world as the
causing factor and states that the issues that the Muslim world faces are purely internal.
Muslims across the world have produced their own sense of victimhood that they then turn
onto others. 8
Fareed Zakaria’s book, “The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and
Abroad” gives a strict political explanation for the rise of violence in the Islamic world today.
His thesis tries to prove that the necessary requirements for the development of a democratic
government are not present in many cases but violence arises when the populace attempts to
modernize. Though Zakaria’s book does not speak specifically to the Islamic world he points
out that many of these cases are in the Islamic world and dedicates a chapter to Islamic
terrorism which he states is a result of people connecting their own individual regimes with the
US. As a result if a discrepancy arises against the regime, the US is automatically seen as an
enemy as well. Therefore the only way to achieve victory against governments is to stop their
international support. 9
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Even further east in China’s Xinjiang region, traditional part of Central Asia, Eric Hyer
addresses the independence movement of the Muslim Uighur minority group in his work
“China’s Policy toward Uyghur Nationalism”. Hyer addresses the causes of groups push for
independence as well as their religious differences from the vast majority of the rest of China.
Because the Uyghur nationals have been found fighting along with their Turkic kin for Islamic
causes, China is extremely worried that another pan‐Islamist front may be called against them
with backing from its Central Asian neighbors. The author also addresses China’s policy of
economic importance in the region as Caspian Sea and Central Asian natural resources prove to
be an important strategic opportunity as the Xinjiang province provides the only direct path for
China to acquire these resources. 10
A very different explanation of how militant Islam has formed comes from David
Commins and his book “The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia”. Instead of explaining religious
fundamentalism in an economic or political light, Commins explains the rise of Wahhabi Islam
as an internal competition for the minds of the Islamic world through different religious
institutions. Over the past few decades, the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam came to dominate
much of religious institutions through their massive spending of petrol dollars on schools and
madrasas. The author states that the actual militant movements such as the Taliban in
Afghanistan were not a result of these madrasehs as these movements have a history going
back to the colonial period but have been greatly empowered by the massive influx of funds
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from the Saudi state. The cause of modern militant Islam was an unexpected backlash from a
corrupt state using its massive funds to promote their ideals in the name of Islam. 11
Last book to be looked at is one that looks at the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in
Central Asia itself.

Matthew Crosston’s book, “Fostering Fundamentalism: Terrorism,

Democracy and American Engagement in Central Asia”, argues that the US has allowed groups
like the IMU, UTO and others to form because of the lack of oversight on foreign governments
to implement democratic reforms after independence. Because of the events of September the
11th, the US has allowed its allies in the region with a political blank check who have in turn
halted all, and in some cases reversed, political reforms. This in turn has allowed religious
groups to arise and gain prominence as many people see them as alternatives to authoritarian
rule. 12
These various books and articles cover a wide variety of different viewpoints and causes
behind Islamic militarism. Some like Samuel Huntington see the situation as a grand struggle
between various civilizations while others take a much narrower approach and look for
individual causes that each ethnic group or state has for allying with Islamic militants. Others
simply give a history of events of various groups through civil wars to explain how this global
movement came to play a huge role in this region of the world. However, all authors, including
ones who wrote before September 11th, see external factors, meaning outside the Caspian Sea
and Central Asian areas, as a serious cause though they all address different international
13

actors in different ways. It is interesting to note that the terrorist attacks on September 11th
caused no dramatic change in the literature as various views on radical Islam were consistent
before and after.
Authors such as Rashid and Zelkina who look at the Islamic movements as regional
organizations constantly refer to either the USSR or the new Russian state, primarily the
former, at fault because of their anti‐religious and political policies and the invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979. The Afghan invasion is a constant factor that these authors provide as a
starting point for armed resistance along religious and ethnic lines. The situation did not
improve as the Soviet Union disintegrated and the new rulers continued with the old Soviet
institutions to maintain power. Even with the Russian Federation, Russia’s harsh policy towards
the Chechen independence movement created a serious terrorist movement that had the
ability to strike at the heart of Moscow at its peak. These sources see these Islamic movements
primarily in an anti‐Soviet context.
Other authors like Commins, Esposito and Lewis see the Saudi Wahhabi influence and
other Middle Eastern ideals as playing the primary role in the primary cause for these radical
movements. With the intention of producing allies in the newly independent Muslim states
Middle Eastern states began to provide funds and ideas to a population that in many ways
needed both. Commins and Lewis see the Wahhabi funded madrasehs and mosques preaching
an extreme form of Salafi Islam as the prime reason for why groups like al Qaeda and their
14

associated groups were able to thrive so easily. The outside sponsors, if even only supplying
political support, were able to create complex organizations which stretched over continents.
These authors see the radical Islamic movements in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region as
trying to reestablish their connections with the Islamic world with fellow Muslim help.
The last group of authors put the Islamic movements in context with the European
world. Zakaria and Huntington are two examples that try to explain how Islamic militarism has
grown out of hatred of the West. Though these two authors have very different explanations
and theories for why the West has come into conflict with radical Islam, they agree that the
West’s relationship with the Muslim world has played a large part. Huntington believes, as
already stated, that the West comes into conflict with different civilization because of the
colonial history in so many areas of the world while Zakaria explains that the Islamic groups see
the West supporting unjust governments in the Muslim world. Therefore these two authors
have common theme that the radical Islamic movements were created out of resentment for
the West.
It is also important to note that when Islamic fundamentalists are fighting against the
West, they do not mean the West as the US knows it in the Cold War era. The West refers to all
European countries and states including the Eastern European one that came from the former
Soviet Union which still hold European ideas and standards. With the defeat of the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, the mujahedeen believed that the downfall of
15

communism was directly accredited to them and their military accomplishments. Therefore,
the current regimes in the former‐Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea regions
are seen as the last breath of Western imperialism which is still a primary battleground.

Providing a New Perspective

The literature, expansive as it is, however does fail to provide any real connection
between the Caspian region and the global jihadist movements operating around the world.
Though all authors post September 11th pay some heed to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the
majority of the literature revolves around al‐Qaeda’s connection and influence in the Arab
world in countries like the Sudan, Saudi Arabia and more recently in Iraq. Then these countries
are linked to terrorist attacks around the world, especially in Western Europe and the US. Very
little connection is made relating groups such as the IMU or the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP)
to how they contributed to the rise of al‐Qaeda and the Taliban and produced a generation of
trained warriors that are dedicated to the ideals of lesser jihad.
These sources go into detail about this topic but fail to connect them in any real way to
international terrorism and al‐Qaeda. The radical groups are only seen within the context of
the state of origin in or, at best, in the context of a conflict in an adjacent state. Never do the
authors put these regional organizations in context with global radical Islam in the same way
16

that Middle Eastern groups, like Hezbollah, are placed. They are always seen as being separate
and independent without connections to any outside groups. The authors largely ignore, or
place in a secondary position, the actions of networks like the IMU which play a large role in
events in Afghanistan and Pakistan before and after the US led invasion of against the Taliban.
Yet the many of these groups, both militant and simply fundamentalists were and still are
widely known to be using Afghanistan or Pakistan as a base of operations. In the case of HT, a
more peaceful Islamic group, they have offices across, not only the Islamic world, but as far as
Europe. Placing groups like this into the forefront of the Islamic radicalization movement
unfortunately has been largely ignored.
This study will add to the literature by bringing these groups to the center stage by
providing a unique perspective that places the Caspian Sea region as the central focus instead
of the Middle East. Following the divisions in the literature that this author presented above as
a guideline, this study will try to connect the first category to the third. Never in the literature
has a study been fully dedicated to this idea that the terrorist organizations that now threaten
the West are a product of the NIS of the Caspian Region. Some authors connect the first and
second categories together by stating that other Muslim countries have spawned militant Islam
as a result of ideological exporting and vey liberal spending to groups with similar ideologies.
Instead the third group is commonly linked to the second to explain militant Islam.
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In addition, as stated above, very little has been written from a scholarly perspective
about these militant groups in English without the connection of September 11th being the
primary focus. Though the 2001 US terrorist attacks do play a large role in this study, the point
is not to connect these individual attacks to any one source but to show that the
fundamentalist movements originated in the Caspian Sea Region. If the US sees itself playing a
larger role in the region, either militarily or economically, the literature must reflect a move
toward the region as it is equally, if not more, complex as any in the Islamic world.

Process of Examination

This study will be divided into five chapters that will examine the presented topic. The
first chapter will be the introduction which will present the thesis and introduce the key
regional actors that will be addressed along with the more specific topics to be discussed. This
second chapter will attempt to persuade the reader that the policies that the Soviet Union
implemented left many of the NIS and autonomous republics inside Russia behind economically
and was seen as backward while at the same time being cut off from the rest of the Islamic
world. Starting with the Basmachis revolt in the 1920s, the first revolt against the newly
established Soviet authority, and coming up to the dissolvent of the Soviet Union, this chapter
will attempt to understand the history of these different areas through the perspective of
18

growing religious animosity. Factors such as the economic conditions of various political units
inside the Soviet Union leading to conflicts and rising tensions such as the war in Afghanistan
will be examined to lay the foreground of the rise of Islamic militarism in the world.
The third chapter will focus on the policies that major and minor powers in the Caspian
Sea Basin have adopted that have either led to the increase of militant Islam or the reduction in
it. States like, Russia, Uzbekistan and Pakistan, to name a few, will be analyzed to understand
what successes and failures have occurred that has led to this outbreak of violence in the past
fifteen to twenty years. This chapter will be brought as closely up to date as possible as
information comes available. Because the events of September the 11th played such as huge
role in how not only the US understands these areas but also how most, if not all states, view
Islamic movements in general, this chapter will address policies of these various powers before
and after 9/11. The primary purpose of this is to see if and how states have changed their
stance toward militant Islam between these two periods.
The fourth chapter will explain how the evolution of various movements were able
blend into one another and create a global militant front that threatens the security in many
states, not only in the region but also in Europe and further abroad. To do this the various
conflicts that have erupted since 1991 that have contributed to militant Islam on a global scale
will be examined in chronological order. Though the war in Afghanistan pushed many gears
into motion that created this modern phenomenon, only limited pages will be assigned as this
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will be dealt with at length in the first chapter. Some of the conflicts that will be dealt with in
detail will be the Nagorno‐Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the two Chechen
Wars, the civil war in Tajikistan and current war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and
neighboring Pakistan. To test this theory the war in Bosnia‐Herzegovina, which was in Eastern
Europe, will be dealt with in brief to see if these conclusions can be applied to other areas of
the world with similar characteristics.
The fifth and final chapter will be the conclusion which will involve not only finding a
greater understanding of how militant Islam has evolved and come into the forefront of world
politics from the Caspian sea region but what also can be done to stem the tide of this
movement. This author understands that there is no single cure for the violence that plagues
the Islamic world today, but by going to the breeding grounds of militant Islam one might
understand how and why it has grown to the level it is today. Some policy recommendations
will be given from a global perspective on what can be done to eliminate this threat in the long
term.
As stated above, the internal conditions of the Greater Caspian Sea Basin will be the
prime focus in these three chapters. The internal conditions, for better clarification, will include
everything from economic policies from the creation of the Soviet Union until today to political
policies that have either hindered or created a strong sense of Islamic nationalism amongst its
people. Though addressing internal conditions may be too overarching for one single study to
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review, this author will try to touch on all possible aspects that have contributed to Islamic
militarism in the regions but will focus greatly on the key aspects that are presented throughout
the research which as of now will focus on economic inequalities, harsh suppressive tactics, and
neighboring failed or failing states in the region.
Throughout the examination the concept of an ever changing national identity will be
present. Numerous authors related to the field of ethnic, national and the overall identity will
show how the rise of militant Islam is strongly related in the Caspian Sea Region. Theories
attempting to show the importance of identity will be viewed chapter by chapter. The final
chapter will take these theories into consideration to see which one is the most applicable
toward the rise of militant Islam.
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CHAPTER II: THE EVOLUTION OF ISLAM DURING THE
SOVIET EMPIRE

Introduction

When analyzing the origins of Islamic resistance to any non‐Muslim power it is
imperative to remind one’s self that armed resistance against an outside force is nothing new
to the world. Revolts in the name of religion have occurred in numerous places at numerous
times and with numerous results. The British Empire had jihad declared on them a few times
ranging from the Sudan in 1885 13 to British India in 1857. 14 Imperial Russia had a very similar
experience when the Caucasus were conquered in the 1830s where a renowned militant leader
named Imam Shamyl led a brave but futile revolt against the Russian invaders in Dagestan and
Chechnya. 15 Even in distant China under the Qing Dynasty the Muslim Hui population staged a
revolt that starting in 1856. 16 It seems that whenever large populations of Muslims where
incorporated into non‐Muslim empires, revolts arose with a very strong religious connotation
to them. These revolts however failed to free their respective populations in the long term but
showed that these revolts most certainly did not start either in the Middle East or in the
twentieth century.
Russia has one of the longest continuous histories of incorporating large Muslim
populations into its empire. The destructions of the Kazan Khanate in 1552 by Ivan the Terrible
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brought the first large Muslim population into Moscow’s control.

The Russian Empire

continued to grow at a rapid rate incorporating many other ethnic groups under their control.
The Great Game during the nineteenth century pitted Tsarist Russia against the British
territories in India. During this time the Russian Empire expanded its influence over the Central
Asian Muslim Turks. Russia always looked at these Khanates and tribal authorities as backward
and barbaric and in need of proper guidance. Periodic resistance arose to challenge Tsarist rule
but were always immediately squashed. Even in the Caucasus the numerous nations came
under dominance from the Russians. Many revolts in both areas arose but never achieved any
long‐lasting successes.
‘An Army of Islam’

These revolts never took a pan‐Islamist face until the collapse of the Russian Empire in
1917 and the Soviet Union began the painful and arduous task of reincorporating breakaway
states which lasted until the Second World War. Because of the distinctly European view of the
Cold War and the West’s emphases on liberating fellow Europeans, the first revolt against
Soviet rule is often forgotten. The Bashmachi Rebellion operating at its height from 1917 to
1924 17 , but lasting until 1933, challenged Soviet authority in the Central Asian states that now
are Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan with Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan
being the center of resistance because of its larger population and centralized position.
Composed of any and all who opposed Soviet rule joined together under the banner of
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resistance which the Russians labeled as basmachis, or bandits.

A large portion of the

resistance came from the Islamic community who opposed both the European dominance and
the abolishment of their Muslim heritage for Christian and Western values. 18
Leaders and fighters from many parts of the Islamic world came to fight against the
atheist Russian forces. During the early phases of the rebellion, the conflict took a very pan‐
Turkish nature as the Ottoman Empire was collapsing and “Young” groups where finished
gaining momentum in Turkey and increasing in Central Asia. The idea of a pan‐Turkish state
formed by jihad came to the forefront with the arrival of Enver Pasha, who opposed in Turkey,
had come to Central Asia with the hope of uniting the Turkic people. During this time the
notion of a united Turkistan became a plausible outcome. Immediately on his arrival in 1921,
Enver began to unite the various basmachis under one command. 19 By early 1922 Enver
controlled over twenty thousand men directly and established a base of operations in Bokhara.
During this time Afghanistan had also become a base for providing arms and asylum to fighters
as Turkic populations also lived in the northern regions of Afghanistan.
Islam played a monumental role in the rebellion as leaders, both conservatives and
liberals alike saw their fight against the Soviet Union as a matter of faith. As the communist
came in, Shari’a courts were abolished, religious leaders were excluded from government, and
land reform threatened the traditional waqf land holders. The fighters in the Fergana valley
labeled themselves ‘an army of Islam’ while leaders took up historical Islamic titles. Even self‐
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proclaimed Muslim communists believed in the importance of incorporating Islam with
communism in order to improve society. Communists in Muslim Central Asia saw communism
in a nationalist perspective and not in the revolutionary world view that the Russians saw. As a
result the Soviet Army would have to defeat the pan‐Turkic nationalist movement in order to
succeed in incorporating Turkistan. 20 Enver himself wished to resurrect the Islamic Caliph,
which had just been abolished in the Ottoman Empire, and took the title of “commander‐in‐
chief of all the forces of Islam, son‐in‐law of the Khalif, and representative of the Prophet” to
legitimize his role. 21
By 1922 the Soviet government, having already defeated the White Army, was able to
focus much more attention on the rebels and launched an assault against Enver which
succeeded in killing him and much of his staff by the end of the year. From here the revolt took
a downward spiral as all the major leaders were either dead or in hiding until 1924 when the
Soviet Union saw fit to establish a civilian government. From 1924 until the early days of
collectivization in the 1930s, small outburst occurred against the communist government but all
were quickly and brutally put down. 22 Isolated small groups operated in the mountains and
occasionally attacked Soviet targets but only with limited effectiveness. Eventually all the
leaders were hunted down and killed. Evner’s successor fled with what was left of his army to
Afghanistan. 23
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The Soviet Union goes over the Caucasus

The Caucasus also saw much action during the Russian Civil War. At the end of the First
World War, the various peoples of the Caucasus rose up against their Russian masters and
established a series of states that highlighted their own national identity. Immediately after the
abolishment of the Russian Empire in 1917, two new states declared their independence and
established their own government. The Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus
incorporated what is today Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia and Dagestan under one
government that lasted until the Soviet invasion in 1921. Incorporating the Southern Caucasus
was the very shortly lived Transcaucasia Democratic Federative Republic which roughly
included what is today Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia which lasted until its breakup into
three respective separate states in 1918. These two states incorporated both Christian and
Muslim populations which lived in relative peace. Due largely to their internal strife and a
growing Red Army to the north these quickly crumbled but not without stiff resistance.
When examining these two areas, North and South Caucasia, in this study, the history of
how these states came into being is not as important as their defiance to being incorporated
into the Soviet Union. Though it should be noted that many of the leaders, such as Sayd
Shamyl, grandson of Imam Shamyl, where decedents from legendary leaders who opposed
Tsarist rule and had held on hope that one day they would be able to establish their own state.
Northern Caucasia was only incorporated after a considerable small, but effective revolt
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occurred where the Mountainous Republic had just been invaded by Soviet forces in 1920. A
“Shari’a army of the Mountain People” was formed to combat the Red Army and gained a
strong foothold in southern Dagestan. 24 However, the last major stronghold of the Terek‐
Dagestani rebellion, as it was later named, fell in May of 1921, only a year after the rebellion
started.
South Caucasia, a more religiously divided area including various forms of Christianity
and Islam, had seen the encroachment of Soviet Russia as soon as the Northern Caucasus had
been subdued.

By this time the unified government of the three separate nations had

crumbled and each had its own republic. Georgia and Armenia had been traditional allies to
some degree against the two Islamic empires to the south, Persia and the Ottoman Empire,
though Muslim settlers, both from Azerbaijan and Turkey, had settled in both territories over
the years. 25 Traditional Azerbaijan however had been split in two between Imperial Russia and
Persia in the 19th century. It is interesting to see that even at this point in time Azerbaijan did
not associate itself directly with Islam but with its own ethnic group. 26 Both groups of Azeris, in
Russia and Iran, tried to keep their own individual culture and language alive and therefore a
strong sense of nationalism had grown amongst the population. Progressiveness had also
inched its way into society to the point where Azerbaijan became the first Muslim state to allow
women to vote, preceding even Western democracies like the US and Britain. 27

27

Remapping the Lands

Following the re‐conquest of lands lost in the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union
under Stalin’s direction wished to make the various ethnic groups easier to control from afar
through a series of different policies. During this time both regions saw both the redrawing of
borders and the forced movement of peoples across all of the USSR. The process of national
delimitation was in full swing which promised different national groups the right to govern
themselves in the Soviet Union. As a consequence, peoples not fitting into a specific ethnic
group were thus removed and placed in their corresponding national political entity. During
this time small revolts occurred, such as in Chechnya and the isolated Bashmachi rebels, but all
were quickly and easily disposed of. Many of these revolts in the Northern Caucasus were met
not only in military defeat but with mass deportation to the scarcely populated steppe of
Kazakhstan.
Though the boundaries within Central Asia are not completely without reason, they
were designed to economically and politically benefit Moscow’s agenda. The primary driving
force behind the ethnic distinctions was language but ignored group identities even when
peoples within a Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) had little cultural similarities. Overseen but
Stalin himself in the mid 1920s, these new boundaries were designed so that each new SSR had
an equal share of resources and to guard against a potentially dangerous national identity from
forming. 28 The Kyrgyz people in particular had very little cultural identity to speak of so a
28

‘Kyrgyz’ identity was more or less formed from the outside which included its own national
history, art and language with much of it European in nature. 29 Kyrgyz life had remained
unchanged for centuries until the arrival of Europeans during the Great Game. 30 As a result
ethnic groups in Central Asia were for the first time restricted by boundaries from without.
The new boundaries of Central Asia also had to take into account the abolishment of
two of the last Khanates in the region, Bukhara and Khiva during the re‐conquest of the
Bashmachi Revolt. Some of the more conservative values of Central Asia survived in these two
areas which were also some of the more ethnically mixed. Psychologically, the destruction of
these two states brought in European and communist ideals into a very conservative Muslim
region with a long standing tradition of contributing to Islam and, in addition, ended the rule of
the last ruling descendants of Genghis Khan. 31 These two political entities were first abolished
and then incorporated into the preexisting political structure under Uzbekistan due to
proximity.
A social revolution also occurred as this new political system was created. Seen as one
of the more backward regions of Soviet Union, Soviet reforms were felt most strongly. The
language itself was dramatically changed to include new words and was drastically changed
when converted to the Latin then Cyrillic script from their original Arabic or Mongolian
characters. 32 Women’s position in society was dramatically altered as European forms of dress
quickly replaced the more tradition nomadic and Islamic dress. 33 Education and literacy also
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became more wide spread as both boys and girls were required to attend school. Literacy in
Central Asia before the Russian Revolution hovered around 1 to 2.3 percent but by 1945 it had
soared to 75 percent in the most rural areas with most regions having anywhere between 90
and 100 percent literacy. 34 This new education however strongly diverted away from any
tradition subjects and focused on a very Soviet form of education.
The Caucasia states went through a similar, but in many ways more drastic, changes as
populations were physically moved against their will and new boundaries were imposed over
old ones. During this time the North Caucasus went through tremendous change primarily
during the onset of the Second World War.

The Chechen people and their immediate

neighbors had always been seen as a thorn in the side of the Russian Empire and later on the
Soviet Union. As a result the majority of the political and religious repression fell upon them.
Throughout the 1930s, the Soviet Union devised a similar policy of dividing the peoples along
political lines as was done in Central Asia. 35 As an example Chechnya found itself in an
Autonomous Republic with its Muslim neighbor, the Ingush. In order to counter any center of
future resistance, the new Chechen‐Ingush Autonomous Republic incorporated both the former
oblasts as well as other areas previously outside the two ethnic group’s physical area in order to
include more Slavic peoples. 36
However these border changes did not stop further armed resistance against the Soviet
authorities.

Small resistance groups operated continuously until the onset of the Great
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Patriotic War when again a large uprising emerged using guerrilla style tactics against the Red
Army. 37

With the German army pushing deep into the heart of the Soviet Union, the

Chechen/Ingush resistance movement had some level of connection with German intelligence
agents and commandos who provided logistical and military support to the rebels. Though this
support was very limited, Stalin and other Soviet leaders used this connection as a reason to
further crack down on the Muslim ethnicities in the North Caucasus. Even persons serving in
the Red Army were subject to persecution based solely on ethnicity and religion. 38
In the final two years of the Second World War the entire population of numerous
Muslim groups, including the Chechen, the Ingush, Balkars, Karachai and the Dagestani, were
mass deported to Kazakhstan and Siberia where a large portion of the population 39 died due to
poor conditions. The Soviet historian Sergei Arutuinov states that the deportations where
however a result of Chechen resistance to collectivization and not because of the collaboration
with the Germans. 40 Most likely a number of causes produced this policy of ethnic cleansing
but, in any case, the Soviet Union commenced with the deportations of entire ethnic groups
until the end of the War. The borders were then redrawn again to reflect the new ethnic
climate. By the end of the Second World War the populations were allowed to return to their
homes only to find other ethnicities such as transplanted Russians and Ukrainians living in their
homes. 41
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It is important to note that armed resistance and the redrawing of the map was not
isolated to just Central Asia and the Caucasus but was occurring elsewhere in the Soviet Union.
However, when pertaining to the two regions just described, the ethnic groups still had a very
strong sense of ethnic and/or religious identity. The process of national delimitation sought to
alter the preexisting identity of these peoples into new ones that would be more compatible
with Soviet Europe. The remapping of the lands was made with the idea of making any future
resistance unlikely which would then make the individual political divisions easier to integrate
and control from afar. Century old political connections between different groups were broken
until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The Political and Economic Environment During Soviet Rule

Political
The political and economic repression of the Muslim populations of Russia, though
intensified under the Soviet Union, started under Tsarist rule. 42 Even before the First World
War Imperial Russia had placed traveling restrictions on pilgrims traveling to Mecca and
nationalized religious waqf lands in order to produce cotton as a cash crop. 43 However, until
the 1930s with collectivization and the Great Purges the religious institutions were allowed to
remain intact but with limited influence. Though the move to abolish religion was not in
response to Islam but to the Russian Orthodox Church, Soviet authorities used this blank check
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to wipe away Islam as well. 44 This period until the demise of the Soviet Union saw only state
approved mosques with government regulated religious criteria.

Publicly religion was

discouraged as an evil that, under communist doctrine, an institution that suppressed people in
their given socio‐economic level. As the peoples in many areas of Central Asia and the
Caucasus were deeply devout Muslims, this policy was most severely felt here.
Madrasehs and other mosque centered functions have a long tradition in Central Asia in
particular. It was here in Samarkand, modern day Uzbekistan, that the madrasehs had their
origin when Central Asia was the center of Islamic though and culture. 45 During the processes
of collectivization and national delimitation the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus saw
both these vital institutions quickly became dismantled as schools were closed, mosques being
forced to go underground, prominent Muslims either executed or deported, and even
communist leaders openly stated to be Muslim where accused of being spies and traitors. 46
Anti‐religious propaganda also was produced in mass with numerous books trying to
undermine the legitimacy of the Koran and of key figure in the religion itself. At its peak even
the five pillars of Islam were not allowed to be practiced under fear of reprisal.
However, by the closing days of the War, corresponding to the return of the exiled
ethnic groups of the Northern Caucasus, Stalin had loosened his grip on religion throughout the
country. Though still severely limited compared by 1920s standards, government controlled
mosques were allowed to be opened, the Koran and select works could be legally owned, and
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even some of the more historic madrasehs were allowed back open. 47 From this point until the
late 1970s repression of religion, though still harsh, was much more subtle and non‐violent as
the Khrushchev and Brezhnev administrations came to power. Instead the publishing of atheist
literature and the opening of cultural centers that limited religion to historical interpretations
where established which gained huge amounts of readers and visitors throughout the years. 48
Under the All‐Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge, or
Znanie, Russian word for knowledge, for example, new atheist institutions where slowly able to
establish themselves alongside a limited Islamic revival.
Though Islam was able to exist in the Soviet Union the communities were disconnected
from the rest of the greater umma, or the greater Muslim community. Religion, at least
officially, was only able to operate under the gaze of the state. Religion became much more
private and socially underdeveloped as people were not able to express and discuss their
personal views of religion in open and organize religious functions outside state control. In a
sense, Islam began to look like a European religion with European customs becoming
entrenched with local customs. This was especially true in Kazakhstan were European customs
were brought in by immigrants, both voluntarily and forced, from all over Eastern Europe.
Large groups of Ukrainians, Russians, Byelorussians and Germans were brought over to work as
professionals in the Eurasian republic. 49
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The Caucasian republics found themselves in a very similar situation as did the peoples
of Central Asia. As in their neighbors to the east, the Muslims of the Caucasus had a long
standing tradition of Islam being incorporated into their identity as many of the nations were
previously part of the Persian Empire. In many of these areas, the suppression of Islam was
seen as a suppression of their own national identity. Many of these policies were not directed
at Islam in particular but had strong and very real implications for Muslims. The only dramatic
difference of the Caucasus and Central Asia was the prior extent of Russification on these areas.
The Caucasus had a much longer history with the Russian Empire and had both adopted Russian
customs to some extent and Russians had moved into the region as settlers into the major
cities. 50

In addition, as with most of the ethnic groups of the mountainous region, the

populations of these ethnic groups were very small by comparison to others. Therefore
combined with the numerous ethnic divisions above, this made any possibility of a common
identity from forming nearly impossible. Only groups with previously strong identities could
fight against their encroaching northern neighbor and remain unified in any significant way. 51
The Northern Caucasus in particular, as a result of the insurrection during the Second
World War, saw the exclusion of local ethnic groups from high ranking political positions until
the later 1980s. This caused many people to believe that indeed they were being completely
controlled by outsiders who had no regard for their wellbeing. 52 This would later play largely
into the psyche of the Chechen rebels in both wars in the 1990s. 53
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Economics
Economics is a valuable tool in understanding militant Islam as areas where future
conflicts would arise where left underdeveloped in comparison to other parts of the Soviet
Union. Indeed the Soviet Union did bring areas like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan up to par with the
rest of the USSR, as described in the previous section, but further investment and allocation of
resources was limited to areas that would benefit Moscow. Some Muslim areas of the Soviet
Union, particularly in the Russian SSR saw very high levels of economic development as large
groups of Russians lived along side local populations and the location lay on economic strategic
lands.
The planned economy the USSR had laid down as policy devoted certain sectors of the
economy to particular areas. Uzbekistan is a perfect example as cotton had become the staple
crop for the entire USSR. As a result investment only was given on a need‐be basis with Central
Asia and the Caucasus, to a less extent, receiving little as there were few natural resources to
be exploited or strategic importance. However, other areas, like Kazakhstan and Tartarstan,
though still Muslim received great amounts of investment that greatly exceeded the need for
the population. This would play largely into the actions of both groups and leaders directly
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
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Table 1 Investment into different Republics
Republic

1970

1980

1988 54

Russia
Georgia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Tajikistan
Kyrgyzstan

60.3%
2.6
1.3
1.1
3.9
0.4
2.1
0.6
0.6

57.2
2.2
1.3
1.0
3.8
0.4
2.2
0.5
0.6

57.0
2.1
1.1
0.9
3.6
0.4
2.1
0.5
0.6

Population % in
‘89 55 56
50.8
1.4
1.6
2.4
2.8
1.0
5.8
1.5
0.9

Source: Information collected by the International Monetary Fund, The World Bank, he Organization for Economic Co‐Operation and
Development, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Soviet government.

The Table 1 above shows in the first three columns the percentage of investment each
republic received from the Soviet government from 1970 to 1989 and in the last shows the
national population as a percentage of the entire Soviet Union in 1989. The table shows that
the more southern republics received less monetary investments even though they represented
a large portion of the population. Turkmenistan is the only the south republic that received
investments close to its population while Uzbekistan, with the largest percentage of the
population in the Caspian Sea Basin in the Soviet Union, received considerably less investment
compared to its population.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan all received

investment that was comparatively less than their population.
The republics directly north, Kazakhstan and Georgia, received much more investment
in comparison to their population size. This indicates that as one goes further north from the
Caucasus and Central Asia, one would see much more infrastructure than they would in the
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south regardless of the population size or density. Though not intentional, it provided an
efficient policy in avoiding breakaway entities and which left many republics economically
underdeveloped when compared to others. It is not coincidence that republics, which would
become states, that are further in the south experience much more political and ethnic turmoil.
This logic becomes even more obvious as other Muslim majority political entities inside the new
Russian Republic received even higher levels of investment. Nationality, as the table shows,
had no real impact on the level of investment in these areas. The only exception to this was the
Chechens who are further north than even Georgia, which will be addressed in the next
chapter.
Oil and natural gas, though important during the Cold War, has become a much more
important factor in recent years. The oil infrastructure therefore provides an excellent example
as the largest producer and refiner can be looked at in understand how the economies have
grown in respective areas. Out of chance, this very important natural resource provides the
best example of how investment operated in the Soviet Union. The importance of oil will play a
very important role in areas such as Chechnya and is directly connected to the conflict.
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Table 2 Oil Extracted from Political Regions
Republic/ Admin
Division
Tartarstan
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan
Dagestan

1970

1975

1980 57

100 million metric
tons
0
20
2
0
0
14
13
2

101

75

0
17
1
0
0
16
24
1

3
13
1
0
0
11
18
0

Table 2 shows the oil output of republics from 1970 to 1980. It is very obvious to see
the major producers of oil with Tartarstan standing out as the top producer here accounting for
more than all the others combined. A general trend that all of them share is that each republic
starts to dip after 1975 in their production. All the republics in the Caucasus have a constant
trend downwards even from 1970. The traditional oil sector prior to 1970s was in Baku,
Azerbaijan where the vast majority of the world’s oil originated. 58 As the Cold War became a
long term reality, the Soviet Union began to expand its oil sector in the Volga Region, where
Tartarstan is located, under fear that any southern military push from Turkey could spell
devastation for the Soviet military and economy. 59 This “Second Baku”, as it would be called,
became the primary focus for oil refining and the major hub of the Soviet oil sector. Oil flowed
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from all regions of the Soviet Union to the Volga Region including the Caucasus and Central
Asia. By the 1970s, yet again the production of oil changed to a “Third Baku” when oil was
discovered in large quantities in Siberia. This time the Volga Region keep its significance as it
provided already built oil infrastructure to transport oil to the western, and more populated,
portions of the country. 60
With the central region of the oil industry leaving the Caucasus, the need for further
investment became less important outside of simply maintaining the pre‐existing
infrastructure. Central Asia saw a similar effect though not as large as the level of oil was
considerably less in addition with Siberia quickly replacing the Volga Region. This made the
areas dominated by Muslim populations less economically relevant than before as investment
funds went to other more profitable regions of the country. Only in Tartarstan in the Volga
Region did the Muslim population retain its geographic importance as a key link in the oil
infrastructure.
When considering the political and economic situation of the Greater Caspian Sea Basin
it is important to see it as an indirect effect of Soviet policies that had an unanticipated effect.
The policies implemented were not aimed directly toward the Islamic communities but policies
did have a profound effect on them. The political policies toward Islam were an indirect result
of Soviet repression of the Orthodox Church in the west.

Economic policies followed a line of

logic that attempted to benefit the Soviet Union as a whole and did not take into consideration
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the idea that the Soviet system would one day cease to exist. Russians were seen as the
perpetrators of many of these reforms as the government was dominated by ethnic Russians,
others who claimed to be Russians, or leaders who adopted Russian culture. This would leave
the other republics in the Soviet Union without adequate infrastructure post independence in
1991 with much resentment toward ethnic Russians living in all the Republics.

A Second Chance for Success

In 1979 the Red Army invaded its southern neighbor of Afghanistan in order to replace
the crumbling communist government and to reestablish order after civil war erupted in the
country. This act, called “an exercise in ‘good neighborliness’” 61 by Lenoid Brezhnev, started a
ten year long occupation that lasted until 1988. During this time the Red Army became
involved in a guerrilla war that resulted in the deaths of over 14,000 Russian troops 62 and well
over one million Afghan civilians, though no official numbers exist, and caused one of the
biggest refugee population the world has ever seen. This decade long war also saw the
resurgence of militant Islam in the Caspian Sea Basin. During this time Islamic fighters, calling
themselves the mujahedeen, Arabic for strugglers, swarmed in from a host of different
countries to defend the Afghan people. The Soviet Union soon found themselves fighting a
dedicated guerrilla force that would soon be supplied by various other countries with new and
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advanced weapons. During the 1920s the surviving Bashmachis fled the Central Asia republics
and resettled in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union found itself fighting an enemy that they had
already defeated sixty years before but on different soil.
Similarly to the Bashmachi Revolt, the Soviet‐Afghan War from the start had a strong
Islamic context to it. The first ethnic group to call to arms against the invaders just days after
the war began was the Nuristani people of Eastern Afghanistan. 63 Nuristan itself, meaning
‘home of the Enlightened’ in Farsi, became one of the strongest centers of resistance of the
insurgency throughout the entire war. The Nuristan people are considered to be some of the
most religiously devout people of all Afghanistan as derived from their name and only after
their example did the rest of the country rise up to join the Nuristanis and fight the Soviet
Union until their eventual withdrawal.
It was this war that brought the Central Asian and Caucasian Muslims into direct contact
with other Muslims from other areas of the world and with the umma. At first the Red Army
sent large amounts of Central Asian conscripts to Afghanistan with the hope that the local
populations would be more receptive to what the government thought were their ‘elder
brothers’. 64 This policy was soon reversed as the Central Asian soldiers were deserting in large
numbers and sometimes even joining the mujahedeen. One such paratrooper that participated
in the initial invasion was a young man named Jumabio Khojayev who would later lead the
militant wing of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan under the alias of Juma Namangani. 65
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This exposed a generation of soldiers who had been isolated from state sponsored Islam and
exposed them to the ideas of a very radical form of Islam with an ethnically similar people.
These soldiers would then bring back their new form of Salafi Islam to their home republics
where animosity was already running high amongst the population of the ongoing war. The
soldiers would come back with tales of the heroic ‘freedom fighters’ as they faced
disproportionate odds against one of two superpowers. The credibility of the mujahedeen
increased even more as the Red Army was beginning to lose ground and lives in the later years
of the war.
The mujahedeen that participated in the fighting were composed of a variety of ethnic
groups across the Muslim world. The Afghan War became the first Islamic conflict of the
modern era in which volunteers came from far and wide to participate in fighting against a
common enemy and stop what they perceived as further European expansion. At this time a
common figure today came from his home country to participate in the jihad. Osama bin Laden
became a chief organizer and financier of fighters traveling from their home state, to Pakistan
and then into Afghanistan. Unfortunately both for a security and scholarly perspective, the
amount of fighters coming into Afghanistan at this time is not known though it is thought to be
believed that many of the people coming in came from various parts of the Arab world.
During the war, various countries including the US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China
supplied huge supplies of weapons to various insurgent leaders especially in the later years of
43

the war. This would have disastrous consequences directly after the 1989, as the weapons
remained while the country fell into civil war. These new and advanced weapons such as the
STINGER missile system ensured that the fighting would continue. 66 Most of the weapons
would go the fundamentalist leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hizb e‐Islami militia who
would later be the Prime Minster before the Taliban.

67

Years later these weapons would

remain as the US‐led coalition invaded in late 2001 the Afghan civil war resumed in full.
Discussion of the Taliban and their rise to power will continue in more detail in the fourth
chapter.
Unfortunately for the rest of the world, the Afghan descent into anarchy was the single
most important event that allowed militant Islam to be projected on the global scale. This
conflict marks the beginning of events in the Caspian Sea Region that will dramatically affect
the ability for militant groups today to operate. Many of these foreign fighters would later
return to their home countries with new tactics and ideological perspectives of religion that
would greatly affect the entire Muslim world where certain personalities would become
dominate figures. Without the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan militant Islam would have surely
evolved in a very different manner. This would have been particularly disastrous for the NIS
which border the war‐torn country as the Soviet war machine had withdrawal and left the
borders open for fighters and smugglers to pass easily through.
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Remarks

Throughout the modern history of Central Asia there had always been a sense of not
belonging to the rest of the Soviet Union. This is shown through the Basmachis rebellion that
lasted into the 1930s and how the ultimate repression of religion did not succeed. The time
between the Stalinist era and the Afghan war saw the Muslim peoples of both Central Asia and
the Caucasus become less aware of their own religion. The Afghan war unfortunately exposed
the soldiers who went to a very fundamental and puritan form of the religion which was then
imported into the Soviet Union. The only two forms of Islam existing in the Soviet Union were
either state sponsored which was seen as a puppet of the state and the Salafi interpretation
which was almost completely different. Because the state sponsored mosques were seen as
agents of the Soviet Union, people who were looking for a new form of religion, they would
automatically look toward the fundamentalists. However the evolution of militant Islam does
not stop with the demise of the Soviet Union but continued onto the NIS as will be explained in
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III: THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Introduction

The difficulties of the newly independent states in the Caspian Region only became
more complex after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Though the people of the region finally
rejoiced over their own national state, the political elites understood that without the Soviet
political system they would become increasingly isolated from world affairs. The Second
Persian Gulf War in 1990/91 had gained much of the media’s attention as the US wished to
establish its ‘New World Order’ in the post‐Cold War world. The Caspian Sea region found itself
in an international political system that knew very little about while the European satellite
states and East European ex‐Soviet republics received most of the attention. Even the Russian
Federation lost much of its interest in the area, outside of the millions of ethnic Russians living
in the new countries, as the country fell into political and economic chaos.
Even in the scholarly field, interest in the area was not present. Directly after their
independence, some literature was published trying to reintroduce the areas back into the
western realm of knowledge. However by the mid 1990s, the Caspian Sea Basin largely fell out
of sight in the academic and public spheres alike. This became partially true with Russia as well.
The Russian Federation largely ignored the issues that had consumed the region as its own
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political and economic instability forced the country to look inward. As a result the states were
left in a limbo with no real historical friends in the region. The peoples had ethnic and religious
ties to some regional powers in the area, such as Turkey and Iran, but contact was minimal by
most standards. This left the NIS in uncertainty as in all the states except for one, Kyrgyzstan,
ex‐Soviet leaders still held onto power by any means possible. With no large international
support these countries became ideal for anarchy.
With no resources being supplied by Moscow to control their populations, the ex‐Soviet
leaders lost their last defense in holding back aggressive groups that had spawned during the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The economic, political and religious repression that lasted
during the Soviet era could have continued as long as the Soviet central government provided
adequate institutions and forces in the republics. However as soon as they left in 1991, the
urges that built up over generations emerged and the new groups of every kind formed almost
overnight across the region. The following chapter will examine how these groups developed
and evolved to the present day. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Central Asia and
the de facto Chechen state in the Caucasus will be used as examples. Their connection to other
Islamic militant groups in the region will also be looked at to understand how the Caspian Sea
Region became the center for the War on Terror.
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‘Tyrannical Apostates’

As the Soviet Union fell, the leaders of the Soviet Central Asia, Kazakhstan and the
Caucasus found themselves almost overnight without a political, economic and military
provider. Though the people of each state wished to obtain national states of their own, the
leaders had some foresight to see that their own governments would have difficulty on holding
onto power. Their legacy gave them only the tools of repression and isolation, as which was
handed down to them from the Soviet Era. Secret police, interrogations and censorship of all
form of media were used in every state under fear that rival groups would take action against
the ruling government. This was the last existing barrier for the formation of militant groups in
the region to form. The loss of military and political control over the state itself allowed
political groups to establish themselves in opposition to the current regimes. This was no more
noticeable than in the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan where the vast
majority of the population of Central Asia resides. The Fergana Valley traditionally has been
seen as the heart of Central Asia both for its population density but also its historical Islamic
roots going back centuries. In addition, most of the major cities of Soviet Central Asia are in this
valley. 68 It is no coincidence that this area became one of the focal point of Islamic militarism in
the Caspian region.
The tensions that had been building for three quarters of a century took no time in
establishing their presence in the region. In less than a year the political instability produced a
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civil war in Tajikistan and the establishment of vigilante groups within neighboring Uzbekistan.
The Tajik Civil War has its roots during the Soviet‐Afghan War when the Tajik Republic became a
center for protest against the aggression and had established organizations with other Muslim
nationalities that would become key players during the civil war. 69 The Islamic Renaissance
Party (IRP) along with a wide variety of other opposition groups contested the first presidential
election where the leader, Rakhmon Nabiev, won and set up a Soviet style state. In response
the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), supporting the opposing candidate for president was an all‐
encompassing political and militant group made of democrats and Islamists.
Though the details of the war will be discussed in the next chapter along with other
conflicts it is important to note the fear that this conflict produced in other capitals across the
region that such a civil war could erupt inside their own state. Interestingly, the civil war under
the UTO was eventually a success which led to elections and a semi‐stable government that
exists even today. The 1997 accords that concluded the war allowed that IRP a third of the
positions within the government and won a considerable percentage of the electoral votes. 70
The groups that participated on both sides of the conflict where allowed to participate in
government. However the majority of the IRPs influence in Tajikistan has faded since the
accords were signed. Since then the Islamic group has not been able to provide any better
future for its citizens and has done increasing worse in the polls.
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From the beginning the Tajik Civil War had connections to the Afghan Civil War
occurring just south of the border. Leaders active in the Afghan Civil War, such as Ahmed Shah
Massoud, had close ties with the IRP and the UTO and traveled regularly in between the two
countries. This put the leaders of the region on edge with the belief that the Afghan Civil War
might spread to their countries in a similar way that the Afghan one had spread to Tajikistan.
Islam Kiramov, the President of Uzbekistan, quickly began to crack down on any
potential Islamic group, or any other group for that matter, that might contest his authority
especially as many of the IRP fighters were ethnic Uzbeks who had joined the fight. The city of
Namangan, which is very close to the Tajik border and has a very large Tajik population, would
be an ideal city for Karimov to make an example. 71 In Namangan time two groups arose. The
first was an Uzbek form of the IRP which had national movements across the post‐Soviet state.
This group was quickly suppressed though it had not conducted any attacks against the Uzbek
government. The mere appearance of another IRP was enough to repress the organization
regardless of the group’s goals or means. The second was a vigilante group named Adolat,
Uzbek for justice that operated primarily in Namangan. Political oppression also found this
group before it could adequately establish itself. 72

This can be seen as the first stage of an evolution of militant Islamic groups in their
region. Groups can be characterized as being disunities, small and struggling to find an
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underlining purpose. Groups like the Islamic Renaissance Party, Adolat, Lashkari Islami, and a
host of others in Central Asia all had the underlying similarity of bringing about change for the
current institutions but had no manpower, resources or organization to implement these
changes. This in turn made them easy prey for the region's governments which instantly saw
them as a very serious threat to its power. Only the Islamic Renaissance Party had any type of
organization though it was not truly independent as is was incorporated in the Tajik Opposition
Union very early on.

The Rise of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

The Soviet paratrooper Jumabio Khojayev at this time would become a major player in
militant Islam as he was a member of both the Uzbek branch of the IRP and Adolat, and had
participated in the Tajik Civil War along with his soon to be companion Tahir Yoldashev.
Yoldashev began his Islamic career by establishing an organization in Uzbekistan called the
Lashkari Islami, or Troops of Islam, which was a nonviolent group that pushed for social and
political change following Shari’a law. Like all other groups Yoldashev was quickly isolated and
banned by the Kiramov regime. These two figures eventually agreed that the need to remove
Islam Kiramov from office was necessary to establish an Islamic Republic in Uzbekistan.
However the loss of Tajikistan following the conclusion of the civil war in 1997 forced the Uzbek
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fighters, who where unable to return home under fear of arrest or persecution to either stay in
Tajikistan or flee to neighboring Kyrgyzstan where the formation of the IMU occurred in 1998.
Yo’ldosh, now taking a more ethnic Uzbek sounding name for himself, became the leader of the
IMU and made numerous statements where he refers directly to Kiramov and his repressive
government. Khojayev would also, at this time, change his name to Juma Namangani, named
after the city from which he was born, would become the head of the military wing of the IMU.
The IMU was largely the byproduct of both of these key figures combining the remnants
of their previous organizations and any other that wished to replace the Kiramov regime with a
true Islamic state. It is both interesting and important to note that the political motivations
were the prime reasons for deposing the President. Other authors, such as Ahmed Rashid,
point to the squandered economic opportunities as a primary cause of the rise of militant
Islam. 73 Though the economic conditions surely played an effective recruiting tool for many
disenfranchised youths, the public statements made by the IMU do not support this. The
following is an excerpt from a public statement issued from the IMU following a serious of
bombings in Tashkent which were aimed at assassinating Kiramov himself. Though there is a
dispute over the perpetrators of the act, the IMU used this only to enhance their argument:

Having attained freedom, instead of bringing back Islamic life, which had been here for
centuries, we have allowed tyrannical governments apostates to seize power. They had
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been fighting against Islam; there preceptors had shed more Muslim blood than the
Bolsheviks; they have jailed, deported, and killed the ‘ulama. They had oppressed
young Muslims with particular cruelty.

They had closed the mosques of Allah,

forbidding the mentioning of Allah’s name. In former times, they had been serving
Communist interests in Uzbekistan.

The rest of the message gives a brief outline of how the Uzbek government is supposed
to dismantle itself. Nowhere in the declaration does Yo’ldosh give economic factors as being a
part of their discontent of their regime. The message goes into detail the current offenses that
the Uzbek President has made against Islam and of being more brutal than the Soviet regime
itself. This declaration to overthrow the Karimov government sounds extremely familiar to the
al‐Qaeda declaration of revolt against the Saudi government a few years before. The group
holds the government responsible for the attacks that kill civilians as Kiramov has not allow any
form of criticism to be raised against himself or his rule. Even some of the early groups that
promoted the idea of a peaceful replacement of government found themselves being
incorporated into the IMU as they believed the current regime could only be taken down by
force. Yo’ldosh’s original group, Lashkari Islami, is a perfect example of this. Other groups like
the pan‐Islamic group Hizb ut‐Tahrir (HT), another peaceful Islamic group, fear that they might
be pulled into a more militant path if the repression continues.
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Fareed Zakaria states that there is no economic solution to militant Islam as the cause
does not stem from economics but from a religious and political ideology. Zakaria is speaking
also primarily about the al‐Qaeda network above other umbrella groups. He points out that the
people that occupy key positions in these groups are occupied by educated and well‐off people
who could have a very stable future. He uses the 9/11 hijackers as an example of this as the
hijackers all came from middle class backgrounds and had the ability to be a part of their
society. The groups operating in the Caspian Sea Region follow this similar path. The IMU and
its affiliated groups wish to overthrow the current regime for its perceived political
mismanagement which follows a similar line to what bin Laden has stated in the past about his
home country Saudi Arabia. This connection also shows how close these groups operate
together in the region.

The rise of the IMU can be seen as the second stage of the development of militant
Islamic groups in Central Asia as the smaller and less defined groups were incorporated into a
larger, more organized umbrella movement. This second group is much more organized and
has the ability to act, often violently, against the central governments of Central Asia unlike the
previous other groups who were largely local in their operations. At this time the organization
also had the opportunity to connect itself globally with other organizations at if already had the
international apparatus established across states.
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The Wolves Return

However unlike the militant groups that arose in Central Asia, the Caucasus had more
economic causes of conflict. This was no more evident than Chechnya were the separatist
movement went through two wars with the Russian Federation directly after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union. The separatists believed that the oil infrastructure running through their
region was not being used to advance the staggering economic status of the republic. 74 The oil
infrastructure also ran directly through the breakaway region which meant that if Chechnya
where to break away, it would be in a key position for an independent oil hub that was outside
the Russian sphere of control. 75 The war saw initial success for the Chechen rebels as the
Russian military was pushed into chaos which resulted in large amounts of casualties on both
sides. This war, like the Afghan war for Central Asia, produced a group of heroes who identified
their nationalistic Chechen cause and the advancement of Islam as one and the same. One of
the leading figures in this conflict was a Chechen named Shamyl Basayev, named after Imam
Shamyl who fought against Tsarist rule in the early nineteenth century. 76
Many of the Afghan mujahedeen again participated in the First and Second Chechen
Wars. The First Chechen War, ending in 1996, saw the establishment of the de facto state of
the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI), Ichkeria being the tradition homeland in the mountains
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for the Chechen people. The national symbol of the Chechen people was the wolf which
became a symbol both for the new republic and Basayev as well. Without any recognition from
the world community, besides one president of Georgia, the Chechen Republic saw little
political or economic advancement. With the conclusion of the first Chechen War the CRI
wished to incorporate its fellow Muslim neighbors in Ingushetia and Dagestan and the militant
leaders wished to make a united Northern Caucasian state into a new Kuwait that would thrive
on its oil reserves. This ignores the fact that all of the other republics publically stated that they
had no wish to leave the Federation. As a result, a small group of fighters led by Basayev
invaded and occupied a few small towns in Dagestan which in part started the Second Chechen
War. Unlike the First Chechen War this time around the Russian military fared much better and
was able to reincorporate the Chechen republic into the Federation and push the remaining
fighters into the mountains.
The First Chechen War became the equivalent to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as it
became a rallying point for the local population as well as for foreign fighters. And just like the
Afghan War, Chechnya became a staging ground for other conflicts in the region such as
Dagestan, as stated above, but as well as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both break away areas in
Georgia where leaders of the Chechen movement, like Basayev would participate and lead
military operations. By this time a variety of rival groups had arisen around other warlords who
had come to dominance during the multiple conflicts. Groups like the International Islamic
Battalion, the Caucasian Front and other minor groups all participated in the fighting. However,
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unlike Afghanistan, the Second Chechen War along with Chechen terrorist attacks in Moscow
and Beslen took away this safe haven and any public sympathy for the rebels and made the
rebels seem like the cruel aggressors. Fortunately for the Caucasus the Second Chechen War
saw the threat of militant Islam quickly suppressed and eliminated as a major actor in the
Caspian Region in a relatively short time.

The Northern Caucasian Front, the International Islamic Battalion and few others all
were largely disorganized and lacked direction during their first phase.

During the First

Chechen War they quickly learned to work together against the common enemy, similarly to
the Uzbek groups against Kiramov. The second phase for the Caucasus was somewhat of a
success for the Chechens but the Second Chechen War combined with the terrorist tactics and
influence from outside states severely limited its popularity after 2002. Even the famed
Chechen hero Shamyl Basayev was killed by what was believed to be a car bomb planted by a
rival group. The second phase, though successful directly after the First War did not last.

From the New Great Game to the War on Terror

The international and regional setting of the Greater Caspian Sea Region also had a
profound effect on the rise of militant Islam starting at the new millennium. The most
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important factor when considering the rise of jihadist groups is the politics of the war‐torn
country of Afghanistan and its political vacuum. Because many of the conflicts in the Caspian
Sea Region have strong connections with Afghanistan, the internal happenings of Afghanistan
can have profound consequences for others. As the Tajik war was in its early stages, so was the
rise of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, or more commonly known
today as the Northern Front, which is a multiethnic group representing the diversity of the
country itself. 77 This Northern Front 78 in 1993 would be the first non‐Pashtu government to
take control of the country in centuries and had ethnic and cultural ties to all its northern
neighbors. 79 The Islamic State of Afghanistan, as the official name of Afghanistan became, saw
the Tajik Civil War as a prime opportunity to expand its influence to fellow Muslims who had
gone through similar hardships. Therefore Afghanistan became a natural staging area for the
resistance as the UTO had its biggest support in the southern portion of Tajikistan. 80 The UTO
however always remained primarily a nationalist conflict even though foreign fighters did
participate under the banner of militant Islam.
The IMU also has similar connections with Afghanistan. As the Northern Front was
pushed out of Kabul in 1996, the Taliban and their extreme puritanical ideology of Deobandist
Islam came into power to restore Pashtu dominance over the Afghan state. 81 The Islamic
Emirates of Afghanistan, as the Taliban named the country, became a model of success for the
IMU when it was established in 1999. The IMU quickly looked toward the south and established
relations and bases of operations while retaining their older ones in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
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The IMU would at this time also receive expertise and funds from the world network funded by
Osama bin Laden. Once in contact with the Taliban and al‐Qaeda, the group was also exposed
to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan which were huge supporters of their own Islamic ideology.
For the first time the IMU became exposed to other terrorist organizations and truly became
globally connected. Though in all reality there was little possibility of the IMU overthrowing the
Uzbek government with its huge military alone, it however rattled the government to their
highest levels. 82
The IMU unwillingly found itself in the New Great Game, a struggle over resources in
Central Asia, where it had instant connection with both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, two
countries that were also supporting the Taliban until 2001. Both countries were seeking allies
in the region and spending large quantities of money to build future support. Saudi Arabia had
been exporting its Wahhabist form of Islam, very similar to the Deobandist Taliban movement,
since the Soviet‐Afghan War and had established a network of mosques and Islamic schools
throughout Central Asia while Pakistan at the same time had been funding and training the
mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan since the Soviet War. This support would continue with the
rise of the Taliban in the mid 1990s. Both states saw the IMU as a further extension of their
network bearing fruit. Though the IMU was not a central figure in Saudi Arabia’s or Pakistan’s
goals, it was an important ally which could be used to place pressure upon the new Central
Asian regimes.
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The fall of the Taliban and the occupation of Afghanistan by the US in 2001 had the most
dramatic impact on the IMU since its founding. Not only was the head of the militant wing of
the group, Juma Namangani, killed in the early days of the invasion but the IMU lost its primary
bases and largest support from Afghanistan. The IMU was forced to retreat with its Taliban and
al Qaeda allies into the southernmost Pashtu region of Afghanistan and in the Waziristan region
of northern Pakistan. Here the IMU became extremely decentralized to avoid detection from
pursuing forces. Today the IMU has played a very large part in the Afghan and Pakistan war on
the Taliban as attacks have been coordinated between the IMU and other terrorist groups in
the region. Though the IMU is believed to have been wounded in its fight with the US and its
allies it is surely still a major actor in the War of Terrorism in Afghanistan and Central Asia

This sudden change marks the third phase in the evolution of militant Islam in the
Caspian Sea Region. The last phase marks the decentralization of the movement where the
leadership is much more of a symbolic figure than an actual commander in the field. As with
the IMU Yo’ldosh took over the militant operations aft after the loss of Namangani and is
believed to be involved in the ongoing Wana conflict in Pakistan. The decentralization is very
vividly shown in the quantity of splinter groups have attempted, and succeeded, in attacks
across the world but still hold onto the idea to over throwing the Uzbek government as their
long term goal.

Examples of these splinter groups include the Eastern Turkistan Islamic
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Movement, the Jamaat of Central Asian Mujahedeen and the Islamic Movement of Turkistan.
These groups have all commenced with their own attacks, including attempted attacks in
Europe under the IMU’s cause. Though the IMU was used here as an example, other groups
exist including Hizb ut‐Tahrir and its splinter groups do and follow very similar though they are
not as large as the IMU and its affiliated groups. For the Chechens, the last phase did not occur
as the territory was reincorporated back into the Russian Federation. Their movements where
all successfully undermined and eradicated by the Russian military. Officially the Chechen
conflict is ongoing but the intensity of the fighting has greatly diminished.

The al‐Qaeda Connection

The three phases of militant Islam have a key position in understanding militant Islam in
the region and its connection to global jihadism.

This connection becomes clear when

examining the Taliban and al‐Qaeda in similar light. If one were to consider al‐Qaeda, the Base
in Arabic, as the central figure in global militant Islam not only would al‐Qaeda naturally have
relations with the IMU and other groups in the region under ideological similarities but the
three phases of militant Islam also fit perfectly with this case as well. Al‐Qaeda, once a small
funding organization for Afghan mujahedeen fighters became very centralized in the years
preceding 9/11 but became very decentralized but with the same capabilities as before after
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the invasion by US forces. This is by no coincidence that the IMU followed a very similar path as
did its allies and evolved in a very similar manner.
Al Qaeda’s influence in the Caspian Sea Region is also evident by examined the attacks
on existing government and state targets. In the region al‐Qaeda has never directly attacked
any targets. Even in Russia al‐Qaeda does not have a presence. Attacks in any state in the
Caspian Sea Region have been carried out only by al‐Qaeda affiliated groups and not by al‐
Qaeda itself. It would be logical to think that if a strategic state like Uzbekistan with its
historical ties to Islam does have an al‐Qaeda branch already in place then another group, in
this case the IMU would be acting in its stead. Even their tactics have become similar as the
IMU and the Chechen rebels have used al‐Qaeda style tactics which include multiple
simultaneous bombs, suicide tactics and mass casualties.
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Figure 1 Terrorist Attacks in Central Asia

Chart 1 above gives the percentage of terrorist attacks in the five ex‐Soviet republics in
Central Asia. Note that the Taliban and al‐Qaeda do not have any presence in the chart. The
East Turkistan Liberation Organization is a movement for the establishment of a Uyghur state
out of China’s Xinjang province which also has connections to the IMU and al‐Qaeda.

The

majority of attacks have been conducted by the IMU but the Islamic Jihad Union is second with
a considerable amount of attacks. This author would have included other splinter organizations
in this chart however some of the organizations are very difficult to identify and whether to
determine if the attacks can be attributed to them.

All of the attacks were aimed at

government and diplomatic targets including the US embassy in Tashkent. The chart shows

63

that no attacks were directly conducted by either al‐Qaeda or the Taliban in the region but
were left to the other groups with a strong presence inside the countries already.

Clash of Identities

One sees a clear separation of ideas of how to view the new states of the Caspian Sea
Region. The religious view that came to dominate the IMU and the Chechen independence
movement came in conflict with the nationalistic aspirations of their leaders. Erica Marat in her
work, Imagined Past, Uncertain Future: The Creation of National ideologies in Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan, states that the five leaders of Central Asia were forced to forge new identities after
the fall of the Soviet system. In each state they took a new form but one common factor in it
was the absence of Islam. Not only was Islam not to play a role in the political realm, it was not
to play any role in the social fabric of society with mosques and other religious institutions
being completely sidelined. 83
Marat goes on to say that the states have looked to a historic past predating Islam and
emphasizing on history as far back as two thousand years or more. The Islamic groups, as one
would assume, focus primarily on reintroducing the Islamic faith as a religious, social and
political system. The IMU and the Chechen independence movement can then be seen as an
internal conflict with region, and at times, international implications. These two conflicting
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view points on how the states of the Caspian Sea Region have dominated politics since
independence.
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CHAPTER IV: CONFLICTS OF THE CASPIAN REGION

Introduction

When examining conflicts in this region, one can view its root causes and aims in a wide
range spanning from political to social and economic to religious. The reality of all situations is
that not one or two causes are responsible but is a result of numerous causes. Obviously this
study will emphasizes the religious causes and goals behind the numerous conflicts in the
Caspian Sea region but it is important to remember that other root causes and aims should not
be forgotten. Ethnic, economic and political factors play at least some role alongside religious
factors in the conflicts explained in this chapter. The ethno‐political setting very often plays a
very prominent role. To give one more layer of complexity, all of these factors are somehow
intertwined together which forms the culture of which the conflict originates in. Fighters
coming across borders often bring the possibilities of foreign contacts which then used to
support the conflict.
Focusing directly on the region itself every state has experienced some form of violent
outburst from militant Islam since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Only a few of the states,
such as Turkmenistan, in the region have avoided all out conflict with either one of its
neighbors or from civil war. Because of the complete lack of foreign involvements to stop
them, foreign fighters from neighboring countries were able to easily enter war zones and
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participate in the conflicts in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Chechnya. The abundant amount of
conflicts easily allowed the creation of trained ideologically motivated fighters with regional
connections who would travel from hot spot to hot spot. This chapter will focus on the conflicts
that have played a large role in the development of militant Islam and the fighters who traveled
across Asia to participate.
Unfortunately from a scholarly perspective no reliable data exists on the exact ethnic
makeup of the various groups operating in the region. However to take a snapshot of the
makeup of the various groups one can look at the Guantanamo Bay list of captured fighters
from Afghanistan which provides their country of citizenship.
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Figure 2 Citizenship of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay
China – 22 Persons
SSA (Sub Saharan Africa) – 1 Chad, 1 Uganda
Total of 2
NIS (Newly Independent States) – 1 Azerbaijan, 3 Kazakhstan, 11 Tajikistan, 1 Turkmenistan, 7 Uzbekistan
Total of 23
Other Arab States – 25 Algeria, 6 Bahrain, 6 Egypt, 8 Iraq, 8 Jordan, 12 Kuwait, 1 Lebanon, 11 Libya, 15 Morocco, 2
Somalia, 13 Sudan, 10 Syria, 12 Tunisia, 2 UAE, 3 West Bank and Gaza
Total of 137
Pakistan – 66
Afghanistan – 219
Western States – 2 Australia, 2 Belgium, 1 Denmark, 7 France, 9 Russian Federation, 1 Spain, 1 Sweden, 15 United
Kingdom, 1 United States
Total of 39
Yemen – 108
Saudi Arabia – 133
Others – 2 Bangladesh, 3 Iran, 5 Turkey
Total of 10
Grand Total of 759 persons

Of the 759 people held at Guantanamo Bay, 50% of the list is Arabs with Saudi Arabia
and Yemen, two countries where bin Laden has considerable influence having the biggest
percentage with 18% and 14% respectively. These two countries are the only real source of
68

Arabs in Afghanistan as Chinese nationals, with 3%, equal any other Arabic state. The other half
is composed of other ethnic groups from the region including Uyghurs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Afghans,
Kazakhs, Muslim Russians and a variety of others. However regarding some of the ethnic
groups that reside in Afghanistan, one can argue that the actual numbers of fighters may be
more as they are able to blend into society better than say an Arab might. Therefore it is not
unreasonable that local ethnic groups would make up more of a percentage than Arabs since
they are less detectable. The considerable amount of Arabs caught in Afghanistan shows the
internal conditions allowed them to operate in a way that they could not in the Middle East.
This chapter will examine how from Afghanistan militant Islam was able to grow and
evolve in the Caspian region into the world wide phenomenon that is known today. With all of
these conflicts they draw the attention of most of the world powers such as Russia, China and
the US as well all the medium range powers that play a critical role in the region. It is important
to note that all the conflicts discussed below have different causes and consequences with no
two conflicts being exactly the same. This trend makes it extremely difficult to characterize the
growth of militant Islam in that the only common factor for these cases is the movement of
fighters to country to country. Instead of examining the conflicts in a chronological order, as
many of them overlap each other, they will be addressed relative to their position from the first
major conflict, Afghanistan, which will be address first.
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The War to Start all Wars

The Afghan War of the 1980s and its immediate aftermath was the single most
important point in time for militant Islam when the Afghan mujahedeen and the foreign
fighters swelled into the ranks to fight the Soviet army. Though the various groups were still in
the first phase of militant Islam, the mujahedeen became extremely effective at combating
overwhelming conventional military force. Though there were surely other internal causes to
the withdrawal in 1989, the Soviet Union had only lost 14,000 troops in ten years, low for
conflicts lasting a decade, yet it was considered to be a monumental military defeat. This was
in part because of the huge amount of military and financial support entering Afghanistan from
around the world without much oversight to who exactly received it. The Pakistani Inter‐
Services Intelligence (ISI) became the sole organization responsible for who received much of
the materials. At the time of the conflict the Pakistani President, Muhammad Zia‐ul‐Haq, was
keen on expanding the role of Islam in Pakistan and in Afghanistan because of his hard line
approach toward communism and the promotion of Islam in society. As a result millions of
dollars and untold amounts of military materials went primarily to the Afghan Hizb e‐Islami
party under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who is widely considered to be a fundamentalist Muslim and
is still currently allied with the Taliban against the US.
From the Pakistani side of the border the establishment of thousands of madrasehs
sponsored by foreign aid in the 1980s, primarily from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states,
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provided both a network and a training facility to students that first became radicalized and
trained. Though many moderate Islamic scholars believe these schools are not legitimate
because of their lack of scholarship and that they are simply an institution that has been
hijacked by radical elements, they became increasing prominent in 1980s Pakistan. These
institutions in Pakistan would later become the prime area for voicing criticism of both future
Pakistani and Afghani regimes and have in many cases become staging grounds for attacks in
countries all over the world.
Other private organizations, such as the predecessor organizations to al‐Qaeda, supplied
funds through these madrasehs to foreign fighters who wished to participate in the jihad. After
the Soviet withdraw an untold amount of military supplies were simply left behind as the
retreating army had no physical way to effectively transporting it back to the Soviet Union. As
one would expect, these arms, the ones still operable also fell into the hands of various
warlords as Afghanistan again fell into an all‐out civil war in the early 1990s. The civil war
throughout the early nineties ensured that no strong form of national government could
establish itself and maintain control for long.
Perhaps even more severe because of its long lasting effects was the huge humanitarian
crisis that began during the Soviet war and today is still largely unresolved. The thirty year civil
war has created a huge amount of refugees in the North‐West Frontier Province (NWFP) of
Pakistan and in eastern Iran.

Pakistan’s NWFP had always maintained close ties with
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Afghanistan of its own Pashtu majority. This ethnic factor would come to play a major role in
the Afghan civil war as the US and its allies invade in 2001 as the NWFP would once again
supply fighters and supplies into Afghanistan. Since the founding of Pakistan in 1947 the huge
border between Afghanistan and its southern neighbor has been poorly marked splitting the
Pashtu nation in half. As a result the two states have always had difficulty controlling who and
what enters one country and enters another. During the Soviet invasion of the 1980s the
largest refugee crisis in the modern world occurred as millions of people sought a safe haven in
Pakistan from the fighting.
With refugees crossing the border and the Afghan economy being completely
destroyed, two long lasting results of the civil war that have played a monumental role in
shaping militant Islam. The first is the growth of the opium trade has supplied the groups with
large amounts of funds and, second, the creation of a large orphan class that all factions have
used to swell their own ranks with new recruits to fight. Forty‐two individuals in the detainees
list are believed to be minors (under 18 years of age) at the time of their capture. There is no
data on minors fighting with the Northern Alliance.
These two factors have enabled the various warring groups inside Afghanistan with the
ability to effectively continue the conflict. However they have crippled the country more so.
The drug trade, though the largest profit gains the country has does not allow the development
of other sectors of the economy with would allow it to grow even further. Opium, the largest
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drug grown by volume, is extremely easy to grow and is in high demand in the world market at
a very high cost. The various warlords, both within the current government and fighting against
it, use the cash crop to advance their personal wealth and increase their power within their
respected political structures.

Hamid Karzai, the President of Afghanistan, has ignored

allegations that his brother has participated in the trade for a number of years. Ironically the
Taliban sought to completely annihilate the drug trade all together as it was seen as un‐Islamic
but quickly changed its policy as the reality of the economic situation of Afghanistan came into
full light. The Pashtu ‘mafia’, a network of drug traders that expands across the globe to every
major city, ensures that the flow of funds and materials to the ongoing conflict will not stop as
long as there is profit to be had.
The drug trade, because of Afghanistan’s landlocked position, has created a network of
individuals and organizations that span across much of Central Asia, the Caucasus and on into
the Russian Federation. This network provides not only an easily accessible route of exporting
drugs out of the Golden Crescent, the historical opium producing area of Central Asia, but also a
complex network that allows material and funds in and out of Afghanistan. In particular, the
states of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and to a lesser degree Turkmenistan have become key actors in
the Afghan drug trade.

This inadvertently allows a regional network of individuals and

organizations to poses the ability to move funds and materials back into Afghanistan where it is
used to finance the civil war. This same network was used to supply the Chechen conflict at its
height with fighters and supplies en route from Afghanistan.
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The orphan crisis that has gripped Afghanistan and parts of the NWFP has given a large
pool of human resources from which to acquire new recruits for the war lords. Ahmed Rashid
has traveled to Afghanistan numerous times in his journalistic career and in his work, Taliban:
Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, goes into some detail about the internal
issues of the orphan class appearing during Taliban rule. 84 When comparing Rashid’s numerous
travels he noticed that the fighters currently participating in the conflicts have little clue about
their own identity, traditions or even about the previous conflict against the Soviets where as
the fighters from the Soviet‐Afghan War, whom Rashid also traveled with and interviewed, had
a strong identity about them not only about Islam but about their historic Pashtu roots and
their proud culture. This lack of culture Rashid illustrates shows how the different warlords
have used these orphans as conscripts in their armies as a military class of their own. After
thirty years of constant conflict the size of the orphan class has increased dramatically. The
refugee camps, in the same areas as many of these radical madrasehs, in the NWFP have been
and still are natural breading grounds for extremism. Unless this flow of fighters and refugees
are reincorporated into Afghan society there will be a militia waiting to incorporate them into
their own ranks and continue the fighting. 85
Since being ousted from power by the US and NATO in late 2001 the Taliban and its
allies have waged a guerrilla war that has thrown the country into chaos. Bombings, fire‐fights
and assassinations have been common throughout much of the country with the national
Afghan government and its Afghan Security Forces (ASF) largely ineffective. Though this phase
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of the Afghan Civil War has not been as destructive as previous phases, such as the Soviet
period and the early 1990s, the level of violence has increased steadily since 2001 with no sign
of slowing. The Karzai government is forced to rely on outside support to maintain his power
and the ASF is largely unable to operate without NATOs assistance.

War Spreads to the North

Directly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union numerous civil conflicts erupted in new
established countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Many of them were aimed at

overthrowing the leaders who were in power during the later days of the Soviet Era who did
not step down. Others were aimed at creating a new state based pan‐Islamic ideas. Perhaps
the two most notable examples of this are the Tajik Civil War and the Two Chechen Wars.
Though both have already been discussed in some detail it is important to highlight the
influence and level of foreign fighters entering the two states and directly participating in the
fighting.
Tajikistan went through a devastating civil war were the preexisting communist
government of Rahmon Nabiyev resisted political change and staged a coup after being ousted
for a brief time. As a result, anti‐government forces under an umbrella group named the
United Tajik Opposition (UTO), rose up in response. Tajikistan has had close social ties with
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most of its neighbors such as Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan which allowed the UTO to
gain considerable outside influence from other actors. Though the UTO consisted of multiple
groups, most of them with not religious affiliation, only the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) was
gaining fighters and funds on the scale that it did from outside sources. Though the war,
destructive as it was, affected the lives of people living within Tajikistan, the most important
consequence of the war was the international implications. The same Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
who founded the Hizb e‐Islami militia and, by then, the prime minister of Afghanistan was
believed to have established bases in Afghanistan alone the Tajik border for Tajik militants and
other mujahedeen to enter Tajikistan without fear of reprisal from government troops. This
gave the leaders in Central Asia, with Islam Karimov Uzbekistan in particular, a fear that if
radical groups were not stopped the entire region would be in civil war.
Though other authors have contested the effects of the connection between the Tajik
and Afghan Civil Wars on other regional leaders frame of mind, one must look at the situation.
Well known authors such as Martha Olcott 86 and Anna Zelkina 87 have stated that the leaders
themselves are the reason that groups such as the UTO and the IMU are able to thrive as easily
as they do. However the facts seem to point that the leaders of the region were put off guard
directly after independence as the ruling elites found themselves in a situation with no real
patron to support their governments and with two extremely devastating civil wars in the
region with signs of spilling over. The state boundaries drawn in the early days of the Soviet
Union were specifically designed, as stated in chapter two, to create a system where one ethnic
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group was never the only single one in the Republic. As a result the current states in Central
Asia have large quantities of their neighbors corresponding peoples. This, in the case of
Uzbekistan, presents a huge problem as some of the traditional and biggest Tajik cities currently
are in Uzbekistan.
This has caused both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to take action in the early and mid
1990s by stationing troops along their borders with the intent of preventing the Tajik conflict
from spilling over. To prevent any group from contesting the governments, any organization
with an Islamic nature was either monitored very closely or outright banned.

Fearing

government action many individuals fled to the chaos of Tajikistan with the hope of establishing
themselves without the fear of reprisal. Many individuals joined the UTO and the IRP with the
hope of instigating political change.
After the Tajik Civil war ended in 1997, and some sense of stability was reestablished to
Tajikistan, militant fighters turned to Kyrgyzstan, which was also under some political turmoil,
as another springboard from which to launch future attacks against other states and to avoid
persecution from their home country. Without the assistance of the IRP various groups
attacked Kyrgyzstan with the idea of regime change in another country. Within a matter of
weeks the attack against Kyrgyzstan was ultimately unsuccessful and many of the groups were
forced to flee to Afghanistan where the Taliban became a natural ally. Many of the future
attacks on Uzbek targets before September 11th can be traced back to Afghanistan. When the
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US invaded in 2001 the IMUs leader Juma Namangani was killed in the opening days in the city
of Kunduz, closer to Tajikistan than Uzbekistan.
Two of the countries in Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, have largely
remained unaffected by the spread of conflict from Afghanistan. Kazakhstan has in the past
played a considerable role in preventing its spread by participating in counter terrorism
operations aimed at destroying any potential threat that may have entered the country and
Turkmenistan has remained under a totalitarian regime since independence. Both states have
a favorable position in comparison to their neighbors as they have no large concentration of
other ethnic groups inside their borders and have few of their nationals in any of the
surrounding states. Turkmenistan in particular under the leadership of the Turkmenbashi,
father of the Turkmen, Saparmurat Nasayev was considered to be one of the most bizarre
totalitarian regimes in the world which kept all aspects of society and life under his strict
control.
In recent years the amount of information pertaining to these groups has been
extremely scarce. Unfortunately from a researcher’s perspective these groups have operated
in extreme secrecy and, to make it even more difficult, Western and US media focus on these
groups is extremely minimal. If these groups are mentioned they are stated simply as an al‐
Qaeda affiliated group. This creates a lack of information to the accountability which makes
researchers forced to guess the group’s identity that perpetrated the attack and the desired
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effect if it is military or political. One such example was an attack on a Kyrgyz‐Tajik border
outpost in May of 2007 where bandits raided and looted weapons and quickly disappeared.
Because the attack fell on the anniversary of the Andijan Uprising in Uzbekistan analysis believe
that the bandits were indeed members of the IMU but now verification by a group can be
found. 88 It is believed however that many of these groups, though wounded, are still operating
in the NIS north of Afghanistan.

War Spreads to the South

It addition to war spreading to the northern states, war also began to inch its way into
Pakistan, primarily in the eastern tribal areas where the state’s Pashtu population is located and
to the south where the majority Baluchi population lives.

Both of these conflicts are very

different from each other though they share a commonality in which they both are connected
to the Taliban in Afghanistan. The fighting that broke out in 2003 in the NWFP and Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) will be addressed first because of its ethnic commonality with
the Taliban. Though the conflict has had many different stages it is collectively known as the
Wana Conflict because of its origin in the Waziristan region, Wana being the largest city in the
Waziristan region in FATA. The Wazari themselves are a tribe of Pashtu that have become one
of the more dominate ones in the FATA. Since its initial phase in Wana, the conflict has
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widened in include many other parts of Pakistan including other parts of the FATA and NWFP
including well known tourist resorts in Swat. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2008 has
been attributed to this conflict spilling over.
The Durand Line, the poorly marked border between Afghanistan and Pakistan goes
through the Pashtu dominated areas and cuts the Pashtu nation down the middle. As a result
social, cultural and linguistic ties on both sides of the Durand Line are extremely strong with no
real enforcement of the border taking place. Therefore the Pashtu dominated Taliban saw the
FATA alone with the NWFP, both Pashtu dominated regions of Pakistan, as a natural region
from which to re‐base and re‐group in order to stage future attacks in Afghanistan.
Though the Pashtu resistance most certainly did not start with the introduction of the
Taliban movement, as both the FATA and the NWFP have always been difficult to control, the
expansion of the Afghan theater of operations most certainly gave militant Islam in the region a
new dimension. Because of the growing Islamic radicalism originally started by President Zia in
the 1970s and 80s, the Musharraf government has come under increasing pressure not to act
against the radical tribesmen operating in the Pashtu areas. As a result President Perves
Musharraf currently does not allow US or any other NATO forces in Afghanistan to cross the
border to combat the tribesmen out of the fear of angering the religious community in his own
country. However the US has made a few airstrikes at key members of the al‐Qaeda network in
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the past when it sees it necessary. Instead the Pakistani government has taken upon itself to
combat the Pashtu tribesmen with limited success.
Not internationally recognized by any state, the first stage of the Wana Conflict saw the
establishment of the de facto establishment of the Islamic State of Waziristan where the
Taliban are believed to be establishing a new base of operation after being ousted from
Afghanistan. The Wana conflict as a result has been directly tied to the ongoing US led
campaign in Afghanistan. The de facto Waziri state might prove in the future to be the next
Afghanistan style state where militant Islamic groups now have a new safe haven of operations
from which attacks on both Pakistan and Afghanistan can be conducted. The effects of the de
facto region are already being felt in side Pakistan as attacks based in Waziristan have been
carried out against government forces across the FATA and NWFP. Bhutto’s assassination is
believed, according to official Pakistani statements, to have been perpetrated by a Waziri tribal
leader.
In addition to the Wana Conflict, the Baluchi people of the south‐west of Pakistan have
also begun to wage a separatist war against the national government in recent years. Though
this event is not unique for the Baluchi people have tried several times in recent Pakistani
history to establish its own independent state, the current phase which started in 2004, has
shown a regional connect with Afghanistan. With the advent of the Wana conflicts, the Baluchi
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population in southern Pakistan once again has resumed their struggle for independence by
attacking government targets with the aim of establishing an independent Baluchistan.
Like the Pashtu tribes to the north, the Baluchi nation is divided along international
borders with considerable populations in Afghanistan and Iran. Believed by Pakistan that Iran
and the Taliban support the Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF), the most prevalent of the
Baluchi resistance groups, Pakistan has tried to connect the Baluchi uprising with the Taliban
style warlords arising in the northern portion of the country. The BLF is also believed to be
involved the drug by supplying the Pashtu mafia with chemicals needed for the production of
heroin. In late 2007 the leader of the Baluchi resistance movement was reportedly killed in
southern Afghanistan by Pakistani forces that were pursuing him. As a result attacks by Baluchi
fighters have increased against government troops.
The situation in Pakistan has more far reaching consequences because of the massive
movement of Pakistani nationals migrating outside the Indian subcontinent. This has created
huge communities of Pakistanis living in Europe, the US and other Western states. Particularly
in countries like Great Britain and Germany the Pakistani communities have caused some
reason for worry as both have had terrorist attacks either carried out or averted as the result of
people who either are Pakistani nationals or live and worked in Pakistan. Numerous attacks
that have been both carried out or averted have involved well educated people who had strong
families and potential futures. However the madrasehs system in Pakistan has found methods
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of radicalizing individuals who would otherwise not be suspicious when seeking to emigrate
from their home country. Through Pakistan the militant Islamic network has a gateway out of
the region and into the western world with individuals that are difficult to detect. Not only
people of Pakistani origin but also Uzbeks, Afghans and other ethnicities have used this route to
leave the region and emigrate.

War spreads to China

Much like the Pashtu and the Baluchi of Pakistan, the Uyghur Muslim minority found the
call to militant Islam as a path to reestablishing their own independent state in the Xinxiang
province of north‐west China. Having a long history in opposition to Chinese rule, the Uyghurs,
the second largest Muslim ethnic group in China, have caused great concern for the Chinese
communists which seek out to minimize the religious and ethnic identity of the people. Like
many countries in the region, China became very fearful of an Islamic revival during and after
the events of the Soviet‐Afghan War. These fears were only solidified as a Uyghur revolt in the
late 1990s arose but ended in disaster for the separatists as Beijing moved in soldiers. Beijing in
recent years has become extremely worried if the Uyghur resistance groups, many of them
based abroad, were to cause even more harm especially right before China hosts the Olympic
Games in 2008 similar to the scenario in Tibet.
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The Uyghurs themselves are a Turkic ethnic group that adheres to the Sunni branch of
Islam with cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious similarities with their newly independent
western neighbors. With over eight million individuals comprising the Uyghur nation, they have
always fought the Chinese Han majority for political independence. During the Chinese Civil
War the Xinjiang province was able establish its own independent state with Soviet assistance.
However the newly established state was quickly overrun by communist forces in 1949 where it
became part of the People’s Republic of China. As of today tensions between the Han Chinese
majority and the Turkic minority have remained high.
With the advent of the Afghan Civil War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Uyghur
resistance groups, such as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and East Turkistan
Liberation Organization (ETLO), have operated throughout Central Asia, Afghanistan and
Pakistan. These two groups have reported to have strong ties with the IMU, the Taliban and al‐
Qaeda and have been labeled terrorist originations by all countries in the region as well as the
US and the UN. Though the real threat of these groups is highly debatable the regional network
is obvious when considering that the leader of the ETIM was killed not in China or even in one
lateral state of Xinjiang but in Pakistan in 2003. In addition 3% of the detainee list held Chinese
citizenship and where members of either the ETIM or the ETLO.
Like many places in the Islamic world the Uyghur nation is located above one the biggest
oil reserves in China which needs more energy to maintain and expand its ever growing
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economy. However the Xinxiang Province has been known as one of the more underdeveloped
areas of China until recently as large amounts of infrastructure are being built at an alarming
pace. To ensure that the flow of oil and other natural resources are not disrupted, the Chinese
government has allowed little dissent to take place with Han Chinese playing an ever larger
political role in Xinxiang by taking up key positions of power in the government.

War in the Caucasus

Because the Chechen wars have already been examined in some detail in the previous
chapter, some amount of attention will be paid to some of the other conflicts that have erupted
in assistance to and in conjunction with the Chechen wars. Areas of Russia such as Dagestan
and North Ossetia as well as newly created Muslim majority states and regions to the south
have experienced varying amounts of militancy connected with Afghanistan, Chechnya and the
outside world.

Though these other conflicts are individually not very devastating, these

ongoing conflicts ensure that Russia will remain an essential player in the Caspian Sea Region’s
militant Islamic problem. Much like China, Russia has energy interests, primarily with oil and
natural gas, which, could land in the hands of a religiously motivated antagonist and inspire
other Muslim groups to follow suit. Though most Muslim dominated lands do not sit upon oil,
key infrastructure runs through the southern portion of Russia alone the ‘Second Baku’ of
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Tartarstan.

However, no other group, including Tartarstan, followed the same path to

independence as the Chechens but instead worked inside the Russian political system.
Though most of the attention is focused of Chechnya, the Nagorno‐Karabakh Conflict
was the original draw for militant Islam to the Caucasus. The Muslim Azerbaijani were at war
with their Christian neighbor of Armenia over the Christian Nagorno‐Karabakh region of
Azerbaijan. Fighters from Afghanistan and Tajikistan rushed to the opportunity to assist. Even
though the war was eventually a loss for the Azeri, the militants were introduced to a new
region to spread militant Islam.

Directly after the Abkhazia region of northern Georgia

descended into a civil war where Islamic fighters where once again drawn to conflict. Though
these two conflicts did precede the Chechen conflict they did not have the same political
impact as the conflict in Chechnya. Chechnya saw the defeat of Russia in the First Chechen War
and the establishment of a de facto Chechen state which was then used to launch attacks in
surrounding states within Russia. Nagorno‐Karabakh and Abkhazia proved to be only the
beginning on the introduction of militant Islam into the Caucasus.

The Pan‐Islamist Party of Liberation

The pan‐Islamic movement known as Hizb ut‐Tahrir (HT), Arabic for Party of Liberation,
is an interesting case to examine when the development of militant Islam. Officially a non‐
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violent movement, HT has the goal of reestablishing the Caliphate and uniting the entire umma
under its guidance. The Party has offices and movements in some form in most countries of the
world but HT has found a huge base in the NIS in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Even
though the stance of the Party is to recreate the Caliphate through peaceful means, all
governments in the region see it as a very serious threat and have hunted and captured its
leaders and suspected members simply by associating with it. Currently in Central Asia there
are more HT members in jail than any other Islamic group with an estimated 20,000 more
members still believed to be operating amongst the public. Currently the governments of the
region and many abroad have labeled HT as a terrorist organization.
HT believes in recreate the Shari’a based system through greater jihad (enlightenment)
instead of lesser jihad (militant Islam). As a result the group publishes and produces large
amounts of literature ranging through pamphlets to texts and holding secret lectures where
debates concerning anything and everything Islamic. However there has been concern that the
HT might move more toward an armed revolt against the regimes in Central Asia. Ahmed
Rashid in an interview with an unnamed leader of HT states that if, in this case, the Karimov
regime moves militarily against other Islamic groups, both militaristic or not, that the Party
would not stand and idly watch. Already the HT has seen the third phase of militant Islam occur
as groups have broken away when the desired results are not met, or believed not able to be
met through current tactics. Hizb an‐Nusra (HN), Party of Support in Arabic, is one such
example where the stance of the use of non‐violent techniques to achieve its goals has been
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abandoned. Another more well know example in the West is the Akromiya which is believed to
be involved in the Andijan Massacre where an estimated thousand people were shot simply for
protesting against the arrest of several business men believed to be ‘Wahabist’. Wahabist in
the post Soviet states has come to mean any individual or organization that has a strong Islamic
identity regardless if the individual or group has had no previous contact with a Saudi‐Wahabist
individual or organization.
These two groups have not only abandoned HT’s stance against using violent measures
to accomplish its goals but are reportable been in close contact with al‐Qaeda, the ETIM and
the Taliban. This progression of events corresponds closely with Ahmed Rashid’s fears, which
he states in another work entitled Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, that more
peaceful groups will follow in the footsteps of the IMU when the governments of the region
begin to suppress them even further. 89

These breakaway groups are evidence that the

argument is not only theoretical but very real for the region. Ironically the repressive methods
used by the governments create a situation where the government uses repressive means to
combat perceived threats to their power and the individual groups seek to replace the regime
because of these same aggressive methods. HN has resorted to violence with the aim of
stopping the repression of religion by the governments use of repression in the first place
because they see HT as a direct threat to their power. Other authors such as Stephan R.
Bowers, Bakhodir Musayev and Steven Alan Samson have even gone as far as to say that the HT
movement in Central Asia could be the biggest security threat for the entire world coming out
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of the region. In their analyses of the Party, the authors came to the conclusion that HT has the
potential to become an even bigger threat to world and regional security than even al‐Qaeda. 90
Unlike the IMU or the IRP Hizb ut‐Tahrir has a truly regional dimension as its network
extends to even Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan where other groups have been unable to gain a
foothold in the past. HT plays a very large role in Kazakhstan and a considerable role in
Turkmenistan which involves the wide distribution of literature and even holding underground
lectures in the capitals.

Iran and Turkey’s Limited Role

Iran and Turkey for the most part have stayed out of the affairs of the Caspian Sea
Region’s security affairs. The Iranian government’s support of Armenia during the war with
Azerbaijan and Iran’s assistance in quelling the violence in neighboring Afghanistan after the
2001 campaign are the two examples where the Islamic Republic has directly involved itself in
the region. In addition these two examples, Iran has funded groups in Chechnya, Afghanistan
and elsewhere. Iran was once on a very slippery slope to being directly involved in the region in
1997 when several Iranian nationals were executed in their embassy inside Afghanistan by
Taliban militants. This shows a clear divide between the two sects of Islam the majority Sunni
and the minority Shi’a in Iran. All of the groups and states described above are majority Sunni
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with the more conservative actors adhering to Wahabist and Salafi principles believing that the
Shi’a sect of Islam is made of heretics and traitors. This shows a clear line between two
separate groups of Islamic militants based on different sects of the same religion.
Appling this to Iran’s situation in 1997, the regional network of terrorist and militant
groups in the Caspian Region possibly was provoking one of the strongest regional player to
intervene in Afghanistan with the hope of eliminating the Shia political body in the world that,
in their view, completely perverted the Prophets teachings. Ultimately the Iranian attack on
Afghanistan was averted by UN intervention at the last moment. However the situation in the
Caspian Sea Region could have looked extremely different if history had taken a different turn.
Instead Iran’s focus for much of its modern history has been towards the Persian Gulf and the
Middle East with only a limited focus on the NIS even after 1991. Much of its limited influence
has been toward promoting Persian culture primarily to Tajikistan which is a fellow Persian
country but does not follow Shia Islam.
Since the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan Iran has provided the Hazara
ethnic group, the only large Shia ethnic group in Afghanistan, with funds, military materials and
construction projects in order to provide assistance to a long time ally. As a result Hazarajat,
the roughly defined Hazara homeland in central Afghanistan, has been one of the more
peaceful parts of Afghanistan. The Hazara political party and militant group have played a large
role in the Karzai government since 2002.
90

Turkey, much like Iran, has remained primarily a financial provider of militant groups in
Afghanistan, Chechnya, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan in the past decades. Very similar to Iran’s
role, Turkey has used militant groups as political leverage against its potential rivals. Since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey has begun the process of reintroducing itself to its
fellow Turkic brothers. Turkey gave supplies and volunteers to the Azeri cause in its war with
Armenia as a way of connecting to another Turkic ethnic group and to further a containment
agenda with the Armenian state, one that that Turks have had extremely bad relations
throughout most of their history.
Turkey has also played a similar role in Afghanistan as Turkey has supplied the Uzbek
political party and militia under the leadership of General Dostum. Now part of the new Afghan
government Dostum has acted without much oversight, primarily because of his outside Turkish
support, by establishing his own political units in the northern parts of Afghanistan; a move
Karzai was publically against but could not prevent. Turkish support of Dostum ensures that
Turkey will have a hand in the stability of Afghanistan.
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Remarks

From what started in the war‐torn country of Afghanistan as a resistance movement
against an invading force, in an extremely short time either was exported or inspired other
militant Islamic groups across the Caspian Sea Region to link arms and rise up. Possibly the
most important aspect of this chapter to take away is the fact that every state in the region saw
this as a threat and, rightly or wrongly, connected the groups with either al‐Qaeda or
Afghanistan. Ironically groups like the IMU, the BLF, and the ETIM which started out with
protesting against alleged abuses of power were drawn into a more militant form of resistance
with strong religious undertones and rhetoric which ended in transforming them into what they
are today. The same is happening with more peaceful groups such as HT which has been losing
members and even networks to more radical elements which see militancy as the only path to
accomplishing their goals.
The Caspian Region does allow three major powers to be directly involved in fighting
militant Islam. Russia and China along with many smaller states in Central Asia have joined
together and created the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which as one of its founding
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purposes is to stem the influence of militant Islamic groups in the region with the Taliban in
particular in 1996. Though the US is not involved with the SCO directly, it has the same goals
and works with member states to accomplish the similar goals. There are very few regions of
the world where there is a common goal such as the eliminating militant Islam and the major
powers of the world come into almost agreement.
This international factor caused by these numerous, sometimes extremely small, groups
is exactly how al‐Qaeda was able grow into the international organization that it is today. The
militant Islamic network spread within a decade to involve every state in the region and
beyond. However the groups always maintained a strong nationalist identity even though they
had allied themselves with a pan‐Islamist organization. Even states that wished to remain
isolated have been forced to deal with the realities of what might happen if groups within their
respected borders might be infiltrated by militant Islamist as with the case of Turkmenistan. In
addition through counties like Pakistan militant Islamic groups have the ability to touch
numerous other actors in Europe and the Americas as immigration has placed large quantities
of people in half a dozen other countries around the world. From one state the network of
militant Islam was able to spread into a truly global organization.
Through Pakistan a breakaway group of the IMU called the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU),
sometimes referred to as the Jamaat for Central Asian Mujahedeen, was the primary organizer
of the foiled German bombings based out of Frankfurt. These attacks were planned with the
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same notion as the Spanish train bombs that played some part in the decision to withdraw
Spanish troops from Iraq. German troops in Afghanistan were based in the northern parts of
Afghanistan and had battled remnants of the IMU and the ISU. Though in US media the ISU was
referred to only as an ‘al‐Qaeda affiliated group’, this example shows just how far independent
militant Islamic groups in the Caspian Region can reach if the need arises.
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CHAPTER V: IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

A Caspian Centric View on Militant Islam

The previous chapters provided an overview of how militant Islam was able to form and
evolve in the Greater Caspian Sea Region and at the same time form tight relations with the
central organization associated with worldwide Islamic terrorism. Without the conditions that
were present in the region, militant Islam would have never been able to grow and advance the
way it did throughout the 1980s and 90s. Very often government bodies and the media give a
Middle Eastern view of the militant Islamic while only giving limited emphases on the Caspian
Sea region. Researchers tend ignore the growth of jihad on the world stage and only focus on
the intellectual and ideological formation of radical Islam from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the
Occupied Territories. This final chapter will place the Caspian Sea Region in the center of
growth for militant Islam and argue that without Central Asia and the Caucasus descending into
chaos, it is very possible the ‘War on Terror’ might have been dramatically different or absent
altogether.
The current view of militant Islam in the American and European frame of mind comes
from the long standing history in the Middle East spanning from the end of the Second World
War to the present. During the West’s confrontation in the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the
Caspian Sea Region was believed to be under the complete control of the USSR minus Iran,
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Turkey and Pakistan. The Caspian Region until the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 was
either under complete control of the Soviet Union, such as the SSRs, or under Moscow’s direct
control like Afghanistan. The Iranian Revolution brought even more complication to the West’s
influence as the pro‐American Shah was overthrown and replaced with an Islamic republic.
Even during the Shah’s rule Iran was seen as a state at the heart of the Middle East. As a result
the Caspian Sea Region fell out of almost all knowledge in the West and the Middle East took
not only the central role of Islam but was the only center of Islam in Western thought.
Indeed the Caspian Sea Region itself is, politically, is one of the newest regions in
international politics as the NIS of Central Asia and the Caucasus brought another level of
complexity to the post‐Cold War world. Originally defined in economic terms as the struggle for
oil and gas routes known as the New Great Game, the Caspian Sea Region was only seen as
such. Each state in the region was politically connected to neighboring regions as their prime
concern with Iran looking toward the Persian Gulf, Pakistan involved with India, and even the
NIS leaning more toward Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However
all the states have a security interest in the Caspian Region that connects them besides in
economics since the dissolution of the USSR.
As emphasized in this argument Afghanistan has played a critical role for the
development of militant Islam for the worse. Directly after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in
1989 the country descended into a brutal and bloody civil war that persists today. Without this
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state becoming a breeding ground for radicalism and a base for operations for groups wishing
to attack neighboring countries, many of these militant groups like the UTO and the IMU would
not have been able to form and strengthen the way they did. Chechnya is a very similar case in
the Caucasus when the Ichkerian Republic was able to establish itself after the First Chechen
War. Groups for neighboring states and Republics would have a base of operations from with
to strike out from such as Abkhazia in Georgia. These rogue states, as one can call them, acted
extremely outside the norm for the region and both were very concerned about gaining allies
with similar ideological beliefs.
This “Afghan Effect” has no such example in the Middle East before the 2003 invasion of
Iraq. The Middle East became one of the many battle grounds of the Cold War where the
Soviet Union and the US were competing for allies and resources in the region. The Caspian
Region was always considered to be firmly within Soviet control.

When the dissolution

occurred in 1991 the US did not try to expand its influence in any meaningful way to the ex‐
Soviet supported countries outside Eastern Europe and did even less for the newly created
states in the Caspian region. Because of preexisting ties between the US and the Middle
Eastern states the US maintained whatever relations existed before 1991. The US placed
almost no emphases on the new states that were at this time without any outside power
supporting them. Though the Caspian states were part of the CIS, the Russian Federation, the
biggest and most powerful member of the CIS, was left with its own internal problems to
struggle with during the 1990s. Though large international support was largely absent Russia
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provided only minimal intervention to save ethnic Russians from the conflict. Therefore the
lack of international support left Central Asia and the Caucasus with minimal amount of tools
and resources to combat militant Islam.
The second advantage when dealing with the Caspian Region over the Middle East, tying
directly to the previous point and to chapter four where the amount of conflicts occurring in
the region. However, even in Chechnya were a large scale war occurred fighters were able to
train and gain tactical experience in fighting wars. These same fighters traveled in multiple
countries fighting in the name of God against the European powers that they place blame on
for the stagnation of Islamic culture. No conflicts such as these are present before 2003 in the
Middle East. Previous conflicts in the Middle East, though have Islamic underpinnings, were
based on nationalistic objectives. Without these conflicts occurring, the various militant groups
would have never been able to perfect their techniques and methods for the intervention of
the US and other states post 2001 in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Even though there have been conflicts in the Middle East such as in Yemen, Lebanon
and Algeria over the decades none of them have produced Islamic style systems the one can
see being formed in Afghanistan, Chechnya and, more recently in Pakistan, in the Waziristan
region. Islamic militancy has been able to grow so strong in the Caspian Sea Region that the
groups have been able to establish state systems whereas the Middle East has not been able to
do so except in Iran, though not based on Sunni principles. One would think that if the Middle
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East were the center of militant Islam the region would be showing some signs of it. Yes there
are militant Islamic organizations operating in the Middle East but the US has provided massive
support to states like Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and any other state that requires assistance.
Ironically this support was originally provided to assist Israel and to buy off neighboring states
from attacking Israel states have used this same support to solidify their rule. The Caspian
Region has shown that there is a possibility for Islamic style states to arise in this region when
compared to the Middle East as no such outside support was available until recently. However
all the established emirates have not been recognized by the vast majority of the international
community.
Without argument, one cannot argue the importance the Middle East has been in the
advancement of militant Islam over the decades. States in this region, much like Iran and
Turkey, have supplied materials, funds and even man power to the region to Islamic causes
throughout the world. However if the Middle East were the center of the jihadist movement
surely the region itself would produce Islamic style political units. The closest Islamic Republics
to the Middle East are in Africa such as the Sudan and Mauritania or in Iran. However there are
numerous states where Shari’a law is in effect around the world. Only in the Caspian Region
have Islamic emirates have been to establish themselves without foreign intervention.
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The Ethnic Reality

The obvious application of this study is how to better understand the situation occurring
today not just for the US and its efforts to systematically annihilates militant Islam but for other
states in the region that wish then to incorporate the populations in these states into their own
state. Fortunately for the world community militant Islam is one of the few issues today that
states can agree on to deal within the Caspian Sea Region.
Obviously seventy years of political and social conditions cannot be fixed in a matter of
months or years. Like much analysis on militant Islam, this author agrees that this issue will last
for decades to come. However this does not imply that the situation is hopeless for foreign
actors and the world must live in fear of future attacks. There is a need to drive a divide
between many of these groups in the Caspian Region. The US and its allies must step back from
the notion that ‘you are either with us of against us’ and pursue a policy of divide and conquer.
The Soviet Union left new states based along ethnic lines from where volunteers are largely
originating from in Central Asia. Though they all share a common religion their national group,
though linguistically close, are not identical.

The example of the Wana Conflict in the

Waziristan region of Pakistan which once again employs the IMU is a perfect example.
Al‐Qaeda, the Taliban, the IMU and other allies fled Afghanistan and resettled in the
Pashtu dominated Wazir province and the surrounding areas in the NWFP and the FATA of
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Pakistan. From here the Taliban have been able to regroup and use this region largely outside
of the federal government’s control to stage further attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The
Wazir tribes themselves have been an armed struggle of resistance against the Pakistani
government and were able to establish a level of independence. However in 2006 an al‐Qaeda
leader, either from al‐Qaeda or from the Taliban (as the exact story is somewhat unclear) was
killed by IMU troops. As a result the Pashtu tribesmen rose against the Uzbeks and eventually
were able to defeat and push them out of Waziristan. Where exactly Yo’ldosh and his
movement are is still unclear. However this example shows how cleavages within the different
militant groups can prove to be an advantage when deciding how to effectively deal with them.
This provides an interesting example and opportunity of how militant Islam is evolving.
As stated in the previous chapter all conflicts have many multiple layers including religious,
ethnic and economic causes. This example also provides an opportunity and illustrates the
complexity of the Afghan situation. The opportunity in this is that the militant groups operating
in the region do have dissension in their own ranks which then resources must be spent to
finding new recruits. The world community should stress the ethnic dimension of the conflict
more than the religious regardless of the realities of what the groups claim to be united under.
If a strong ethnic dimension is able to implant itself in the Taliban or the various Central Asian
groups one could see them undermining themselves instead of being united in their struggle.
This would have disastrous effects for al‐Qaeda, being predominantly Arab, as ethnically and
linguistically they are completely different from the Turkic and Persian ethnic groups in the
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region. The Chechen conflict went through a similar experience whereas of current the leaders,
along with their numerous predecessors, of the major Chechen rebel group are not even from
the region but from Saudi Arabia. This has caused the loss of much of the Chechen support for
the Ichkerian movement.
As a result of this one cannot look at the region in terms of states as nation‐states have
not fully established themselves in the Caspian Region. The literature looks at militant Islam
primarily through either a religious or state centric view but at the same time largely ignoring
the ethnic dimension. However the ethnic dimension for many of these groups and conflicts
originate from ethnic struggles. Just by the names of some of the groups, one can see the
ethnic struggle that the group is underlining. The IMU, the UTO, the Taliban, in its earlier years,
and the Ichkerian movements all have an ethnic dimension that differ them from ‘the Base’ and
its Arab members. However as the ethnic groups come into contact with al‐Qaeda they quickly
become a regional or global organization instead of narrowly focusing on their original goal.
Again we will take the IMU as an example.

Though the exact movements and

declarations made by the movement are not publically made or made public by the
governments’ involved one can analyze the course the Uzbek Islamic group has made in regard
to the global jihadism. Chapter three described the growth of the IMU and followed is history
up to it being expelled from Afghanistan in the 2001 phase of the Afghan Civil War. In Pakistan
there have been rumors that the IMU has changed its official name to the Islamic Movement of
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Turkistan. Though there has been evidence that this new name did not stick this might indicate
that the IMU is being pushed to be a regional organization based on an al‐Qaeda model. Al‐
Qaeda and its directly affiliated groups such as al‐Qaeda in the Maghreb and al‐Qaeda in Iraq
emphasize, by their names, a regional affiliation rather that an ethnic one. The IMU, as its
name indicates, has an ethnic focus with aspirations on challenging the preexisting Karimov
regime .

Tightening the Noose

In many ways the Second Chechen War can be seen as a significant success against
militant Islam as one of the most troubled areas of the world was able to be reincorporated
into the world system. As a result the Russian tactic was able to defeat the insurgency along
with a variety of militant groups funded from outside. Though some of the tactics cannot be
applied directly to other situations in the region, their intentions can be used for a template for
change in other situations. Though the Second War has been a long and drawn out conflict it
has shown dramatic successes for the Russian Federation. The Soviet Union, and later, the
Russian Federation have considerable experience in the region which other actors do not. The
Second Chechen War was the third such conflict that the Soviet/Russian military has been
involved with the Caspian Region against militant Islam in the past twenty years. This has
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allowed the military to evolve and improve its tactics to maximize their effectiveness. Other
states such as the US and other European powers do not have such experience in the region.
Much of the outside world has little knowledge of and even less understanding of the Caspian
Region.
Possible the most important objective in preventing the growth of militant Islam is
cutting off the flow of fighters and funds to groups that are operating in the area. This task is
twofold. The first is securing the borders between states to contain the spread of militant
groups. The second task is to minimize the influence the level of support of the militant groups
among the population. The Chechen model was able to accomplish this relatively quickly
though with large amounts of human loss. Minimizing both the funding of the rebels as well as
effective political isolation made the Icherian republic extremely short lived. However no other
strategy has been effective in combating a well entrenched enemy and succeeding in
reincorporating the area as it did.
One of the more difficult tasks to accomplish is the complete fault of fighters crossing
the borders primarily between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan. This requires that the states involved, with outside help if necessary, put in a real
effort to block these crossing points and any other crossing points that may form. The Georgian
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are examples of this as the separatist
conflicts are believed to have strong ties with the Chechen militants. Only when the Russian
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Federation was able to effectively cut off the trans‐border routes to and from areas like
Chechen, Dagestan and Ingushetia from the southern republics were the other militant groups
able to be dealt with more effectively. This same policy needs to be implemented in Central
Asia.
This however proves much more difficult as the area is much larger and with more
people. The governments in the region, especially Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan, need to
play a role to cutting the flow of fighters crossing the borders. The most difficult case of this
would be in Pakistan’s Waziristan where the federal government has little control over the
border between the mountainous Pashtun dominated region. The current events of Pakistan
have only complicated the situation even more as the ability of the Pakistani government to
project its power within its own borders has diminished greatly. If the lessons learned from the
Chechen Wars can be effectively applied to other parts of the Caspian Region the same results
may indeed result. However it must be in conjunction with Russia and have the support of
governments in the region.

Iraq

One of more dangerous possibilities for the future of militant Islam is the 2003 Iraq war.
Though this author does not want to shift completely to the Middle East it is important to do so
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as many of the characteristics that have been examined in the study are present. If the war in
Iraq is not properly conducted or falls into even more disarray, it has the real possibility of
becoming the next ‘Afghanistan’ for militant Islam. It is widely known that the Iraq war has
become a focal point for foreign fighters entering the country and playing a crucial role in the
civil war. Though the war in Afghanistan is not complete, which still is a rallying point for
Central Asians, Chechens and other ethnics groups from the Caucasus, numerous other
ethnicities have been caught or killed alongside Arab nationals. However, this time other
neighboring countries such as Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia are acting like bases of origin for the
various warring factions. Iraq has already become the next conflict involving foreign Islamic
fighters. However there are more worrisome indicators that Iraq may become the next Afghan
style power vacuum. Opium and other drugs have, for example, been reported being grown in
southern Iraq near Basra. This could indicate Iraq might be sliding even further into warlordism
and the economy is collapsing even further into ruin.
The same ethnic approach can and has been applied to Iraq. The current Anbar
Awakening that has occurred in the Sunni dominated regions against al‐Qaeda in Iraq has
shown that the US is willing to support some militia groups over others, such as the Shia militias
in Baghdad and in the south of the country. US support has been one of the major factors for
al‐Qaeda being pushed almost completely out of the Sunni dominated central portion of the
country. At the same time the US has moved against the Shia backed militias that operate
without the same control as the Sunni ones with the hope of strengthening the national
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government. Though the Iraq conflict is still far from settled the US siding with one group over
another has benefited the situation greatly.
The situation becomes much more complex for this study as the influence of Iran and
Turkey take on an extremely different shape. Unlike how the two countries play little direct
roles in the Caspian Sea Region, Iran and Turkey are willing to provide more direct influence on
Iraq. Turkey has been sending small, and sometimes large, excursions into the northern
Kurdish regions of Iraq with the hope of combating Kurdish terrorist groups. Iran, unlike
Afghanistan, has become directly involved in Iraq as Iranian agents are reported to be operating
within Shia groups and funding of militia groups is believed to have been increased dramatically
with the aim of attacking US and coalition troops.

Final Remarks

Simply because the Caspian Sea Region of commonly held view of militant Islam can be
changed from the Middle East does not necessarily imply that the situation is any more
complex or more difficult. The characteristics that plague Afghanistan, parts of the Caucasus,
and elsewhere in the region have comparisons in other parts of the world. The situations in
Iraq and the Occupied Territories present very similar scenarios that could quiet realistically
spiral out of control in not properly watched and acted upon but are not as urgent as other
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areas like Afghanistan and Chechnya. However the creation and impact of al‐Qaeda and its
affiliated groups can be felt most dramatically in the Caspian Sea Region as al‐Qaeda related
groups with ties to Afghanistan has created a network. This network has been established over
decades as Afghanistan became the center for militant Islam. As a result the effects of militant
Islam with the connection to al‐Qaeda have been largely confined to the Caspian Sea Region.
Also like the Middle East there is no simple answer to stopping militant Islam without
addressing the core causes of why these groups arose. The region has a unique combination of
political, economic and social issues that prevent the region from containing the threat that
these groups pose to both the governments in the region and governments abroad. These
numerous causes cannot and will not be resolved in a matter of months and years but instead
with decades, and possible even longer, of hard effort form numerous parties involved.
International organizations along with states must play a constructive role in effectively
resolving militant Islam.
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APPENDIX: MAPS
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Political Map of the Caspian Sea Region 1.1

Topographical Map of the Caspian Sea Region 1.2
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Political Map of the Caucasus 1.3
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Political Map of Afghanistan and Pakistan 1.5
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